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ABSTRACT
This thesis, a single case study, focuses on the manner in which Belarus handles
the sovereignty that it acquired during the implosion of the Soviet Union.
Various Belarusian factors likely to generate or to foster national identity and
state independence are examined. None of them (ethno-cultural patterns, institutions and
politics, attitudes of the Belarusian people) gives reason for optimism. Belarusian na-
tional identity is poorly developed and unable to serve as a formative factor in nation-
building. In addition, Belarus shows a high economic dependence on Russia. Thus, the
country pursues a course of close alignment with its former overseer.
Belarus and Russia have initiated an integration process, the real aims of which
are unclear. Bilateral treaties remain largely unimplemented, while the countries' leaders
make contradictory statements about the possibility of a Belarusian-Russian unification.
For Russia, this inconsistency reflects a lack of consensus on the issue within the gov-
ernment and among the various political factions. In the absence of an agreed-upon for-
eign policy in the "near abroad", Russian nostalgia for Slavic unity and the loss of the
Empire further complicates the debate.
Hence, the future of a sovereign Belarus or the form of a Belarusian-Russian po-
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis, a single case study, focuses on the manner in which Belarus handles
the sovereignty that it acquired during the implosion of the Soviet Union.
Specifically, the thesis examines: (1) the status of various Belarusian factors
likely to foster national identity and state independence; (2) the project of a union be-
tween Belarus and Russia as initiated by the Treaty on the Formation of the Community
of Belarus and Russia of April 1996 and the Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia
of April 1997; and (3) the stance of different Russian factions on the issue. In addition,
(4), the thesis sketches what could be a realistic regional integration process under the
lead of Russia as the natural center of gravity of the area.
(1): All the examined factors likely to strengthen Belarusian national identity
(ethno-cultural patterns, institutions and politics, and the attitudes of the Belarusians to-
ward their sovereignty) give no reason for optimism. Ethno-culturally and historically,
Belarus's affinities with Russia are such that differences between the two are minimal.
Likewise, the Belarusian institutions and politics do little to develop nationhood. The na-
tionalist opposition has been muzzled by an authoritarian regime that strives for close ties
with Russia. Civil liberties - especially access to private property and to uncensored in-
formation - are curtailed. The Lukashenko regime is not the cause for Belarus's wish for
a close association with Russia but a consequence of the overall attitude of the Belaru-
sians toward their sovereignty. Despite an active but numerically weak nationalist oppo-
sition, the majority of the Belarusians sees the country's future in the framework of Rus-
IX
sia-oriented arrangements and regularly sanctions the government's policies at the ballot
box. In addition, Belarus shows a high economic dependence on its former overseer.
It is thus likely that Belarus will continue to look for an alignment with Russia
determined by affinities and an asymmetrical economic dependence. The thesis argues
that this is, after all, a legitimate posture.
(2): Officially, Belarus and Russia are on an integrative convergence course. The
basic problem is that the two parties follow different objectives and that the level of inte-
gration and the legal framework within which the integration should occur remain un-
clear. Though the two treaties signed in 1996 and 1997 are ambitious declarations of in-
tent, their wording is vague and - in places - contradictory. The agreements neither pri-
oritize the integration steps nor set up an implementation agenda. The future union's
mixed bodies - a Supreme Council, a Parliamentary Assembly, and an Executive Com-
mittee - lack binding powers or still await their statute. With regard to the preparatory
steps agreed upon in the first treaty, the Supreme Council and the Executive Committee
passed resolutions of merely minor importance throughout 1996. Finally, contradictory
statements of the two countries' leaders regarding the possibility of a Belarusian-Russian
reunification reveal the misuse of the union project for political demagoguery.
Hence, the two treaties and the integrative activities that have occurred since
April 1996 say little about the likely evolution of the union project. It is difficult if not
impossible to assess the future line of action of the two parties on the basis of the written
agreements.
(3): The Russian Federation has not yet taken its final shape as a state. Corre-
spondingly, a consensus among the Russian elites on the country's national interests - to
include its relations with the other former Soviet republics - has not yet emerged. Thus,
the views on the desirable nature and intensity of the country's relations with Belarus also
vary. The vague plan for a unification matches the views of the Kremlin conservatives,
the Russian nationalists and Communists in parliament, and of a broad section of the
elites and the population at large that mourns the loss of the Empire or takes to the nos-
talgia for fraternal Slavic unity. On the other hand, opponents of a special Russian-
Belarusian relationship are the Kremlin reformers and the liberal democrats. While the
former refuse to saddle Russia with the Belarusian economy, the latter denounce a Be-
larusian domestic situation that tramples human rights and the freedom of information.
Much of Russia's further policy toward the question will thus depend on the abil-
ity of the Russian elites to find a consensus on the Federation's foreign policy strategy
and on the political faction that will hold power in the post-Yeltsin era.
(4): Because the Belarusian-Russian integration process is viewed as an inappro-
priate conduct of foreign policy, the thesis sketches what could be a realistic regional in-
tegration process under the lead of Russia as the natural major power of the area. The
main propositions are that in any integration procedure Russia should: (a) refrain from
aiming at political superstructures before defining and prioritizing concrete integration
objectives; (b) strive first for an economic, not for a political, integration; (c) initiate the
process on a bilateral basis, outside the CIS frame; (d) preserve the formal sovereignty of
its integration partners while establishing closer political bonds in a subsequent integra-
tion step; (e) refrain - at least on its western flank - from establishing a system of collec-
tive defense that would merely be considered as a threat by potential integration partners;
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Five years after the collapse of Soviet Communism, Russia, the Newly Independ-
ent States, and some of Europe's former Soviet satellites are still not settled. It is likely
that the emergence of a new regional order will be a lengthy and complicated venture.
The importance of the area makes it imperative to closely monitor the evolution of the
situation.
On 27 July 1990, the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) - or short
Belorussia - emulated some of its sister republics and issued a declaration of sovereignty.
Following the abortive August 1991 Moscow coup, the BSSR's Supreme Soviet pro-
claimed the country's independence on 25 August 1991. The Belorussian Communist
Party (BCP) was suspended. On 18 September 1991, the country's name was changed to
Republic of Belarus - or Belarus for short - - 1 So began the move from the Soviet regime
to a new future.
Since then, Belarus has been very hesitant to assume its sovereignty and to enter
on the road to nationhood. The country's leadership, the local elites, and the popular will
expressed at the ballot box aim at close ties with Russia. Officially, Belarus and Russia
are on a convergence course, moving toward an association that will reunify what has
been torn asunder in 1991. Thus, Belarus appears to be the first post-colonial state in
modern history that is striving to reunite with its former imperial overseer.
The different names for the country or the area and the various orthographies used to spell
them are confusing but symptomatic of the thesis's topic! To simplify matters, the text will use
Belarus and Belarusian throughout, except in quotes and where a differentiation is necessary for a
better understanding
1
To be sure, a unification of Belarus and Russia would conjure up the specter of
Soviet imperialism. A westward expansion of the Russian Federation would be perceived
as a serious threat by the Baltic states, Ukraine, Poland, and - possibly - by an enlarged
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
On the other hand, a consolidation of Russia's relations with the Central and East-
ern European states is legitimate and desirable. A Russian foreign policy strategy that
would initiate a constructive regional rapprochement or integration process with countries
that are not aiming at going "back to Europe" or are unlikely to be invited to join the
major Western organizations would help to stabilize the region.
Belarus and Russia have initiated a Union process, the real aims of which remain
unclear. For obvious electoral and populistic demagoguery, the two countries' leaders
now and then beat the drum of a complete unification, while the more modest provisions
of various bilateral treaties remain largely unimplemented. Furthermore, Belarus has
shifted toward an authoritarian - if not dictatorial - regime that has muzzled the nation-
alist movement and acts in an increasingly arbitrary way. Hence, the future of an inde-
pendent Belarus or the form of a Belarusian-Russian association is still to be decided.
In the first chapter, the present thesis - a single case study - reviews the factors
that forge national identity and focuses on theoretical aspects of alignment politics.
The thesis then analyzes the current status of various Belarusian variables with
regard to their impact as formative factors for nation-building and independence.
In the subsequent chapter, the thesis discusses the ongoing project of a Union
between Belarus and Russia. Going beyond the various slogan-like declarations of intent
by the Russian leadership, the chapter that follows tries to determine the true stance con-
cerning the issue of the different Russian political factions.
Finally, the last chapter sketches what could be a realistic regional integration
process under the lead of Russia as the natural geographic, political, economic, and cul-
tural 'center of gravity' of the area.
After President Aleksandr Lukashenko's struggle with the Belarusian Legislative
and Constitutional Council on the occasion of the 23 November 1996 referendum, Be-
larus returned to the newspapers' front pages on 2 April 1997 when it signed the 'Treaty
on the Union of Belarus and Russia' with Moscow. Though the situation is constantly
evolving, it is unlikely that some turnabout will invalidate the thesis's core argumentation




National identity is a collective cultural phenomenon. While nationalism, as an
ideology and form of politics is clearly related to the wider spectrum of national identity,
it has nevertheless to be clearly distinguished from the latter. National identity has much
to do with sentiments and symbolism and typically refers to ancestry or territory - or both
- as the basis of a political community.
This section reviews the factors that create and shape national identity. The pur-
pose in doing so is to determine the Belarusian variables that will be analyzed in the fol-
lowing chapter. The section follows the line of argumentation of Anthony Smith, pre-
sented in his standard work, National Identity, and of Urs Altermatt, in his book Das Fa-
nal von Sarajevo - Ethnonationalismus in Europa . 2
What is a "nation" and what attributes does "national identity" imply? The per-
ception has evolved over time and become truly multidimensional. The term nation is de-
rived from the Latin natio - from nasci or to be born - and thus means first a community
of common origin or descent: Medieval sources equate the word nationes with gentes or
peoples. This common origin of peoples was then early on associated with a shared
common language. So for example, the organizational structure of the Council of Con-
stance - held from 14 14 to 1417 - did not assign the French speaking clergies from Sa-
voy, the Provence, and Lorraine to the so-called natio germanwa despite the fact that
Anthony Smith, National Identity , Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991; and Urs Alter-
matt, Das Fanal von Sarajevo - Ethnonationalismus in Europa Zurich (Switzerland): Verlag
Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 1996
they belonged politically to the Holy Roman Empire or Reich. The concept of the nation
being a political and legal entity is of more recent origin: In 1694, the Academie
Francaise defined a nation as consisting of the inhabitants of a same state or country that
live under a same legislation and use a same language. Finally, the concept of a nation as
a 'community of shared interests' goes back to an 1 882 speech of the French philosopher
and historian Ernest Renan. 3
A fundamental and still referred to differentiation between two basic concepts of
the nation in its state expression was coined in 1907 by the German historian Friedrich
Meinecke. Meinecke distinguished the Kulturnation, a largely passive, ethnic and cultural
community, from the Staatsnation, an active, self-determining political entity. 4
Historically, the Kulturnation has been viewed as a non-Western idea of national
identity in that it sprang up mainly in Eastern Europe and in Asia. Anthony Smith names
this model an "ethnic conception of the nation" 5 with four different facets: (1) Genealogy
and presumed descent ties; (2) Popular or demotic mobilization; (3) Vernacular language;
and (4) Customs and traditions.
( 1 ): The ethnic conception stresses presumed descent rather than territory. The
nation is a kind of 'super-family'. It traces its roots to an alleged common ancestry and
views therefore its members to be differentiated from outsiders by brotherly 'family ties'.
Hence, in a Kulturnation, nationality is commonly acquired by descent - the so-called ius
sanguinis or right of the blood -, whereas in a Staatsnation citizenship is usually granted
3 Urs Altermatt, Op. cit„ pp. 26-27
4
Ibid.
, pp. 29-42; and Anthony Smith, Op. cit. . pp. 8-15
5
Ibid, (Smith), p. 1
1
6
to every person born within the state's boundaries - according to the ius soli or right of
the soil.
6
(2): This emphasis on family ties leads to a strong popular element in the con-
ception of the nation. The people provide the ultimate object of nationalist aspirations
even if they are not actually mobilized for political action. In other words, people are
used as the "final rhetorical court of appeal" 7 and leaders will justify their actions as be-
ing the implementation of the popular will. (3) and (4): The component of the patria -
that is, of the fatherland or of the spiritual community - of a nation expresses itself
through vernacular culture, usually language, customs, and traditions. The Kulturnation
emphasizes popular awareness of the nation's history, linguistic tradition, and myths.
Hence, historians, philologists, and folklorists have played and play a central role in a
Kulturnatioris nationalist movement.
On the other hand, the Staatsnation is said to be a Western or civic-territorial con-
cept of the nation. Its four main elements are: (1) A spatial-territorial conception; (2) A
sense of legal-political community; (3) A perception of legal equality among the nation's
members; and (4) A common civic culture and ideology. 9
(1): The civic conception relies heavily on the perception of the territory as the
'home-land' or 'cradle' of the people even if it is not the land of ultimate origin. People
6
Urs Altermatt. Op. cit.
. p. 34





and territory belong together; the territory shapes the people and vice versa. 10 The home-
land is the repository of the nation's historical memories and becomes a kind of sacred
place whose importance can only be perceived by the members of the nation. (2): The
patria is perceived as a community of laws and institutions with a single political will.
The common institutions give expression to common political sentiments and purposes. It
is irrelevant whether this patria is based on centralized and unitary or on federal institu-
tions. The important - though often circumscribed - participation of the citizen in the
patria's activities can occur as well in the frame of a one-party system organized on a ter-
ritory-wide basis, as in the small, diversified, and multi-layered sub-units of a federal
system.
11
(3): Concurrent with the sense of legal and political community, the Staatsna-
tion ties its members into a perception of legal equality. This equality expresses itself in
political rights and duties, civil liberties and obligations, and socio-economic rights.
While all members of the nation are legally equal, outsiders are correlatively excluded
from those rights and duties. 12 (4): The perception of a legally equal community rests on
a set of common "understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas, that bind the
population together." 13 In other words, nations must have a measure of common culture
and civic ideology. The task of ensuring a common mass culture is usually handed over
to the system of public education.
The early Dutch who saw themselves as "formed by the high seas and as forging the earth









At a closer look, this dual typology is a rather abstract construct. The expression
of a country's national identity always contains ethno-cultural and civic-territorial ele-
ments in varying degrees and different forms. Most often also, the emphasis given to
factors of the one or the other conception within the same nation changes over time. In
other words, national identity comprises both a cultural and political identity and is lo-
cated in a political community as well as a cultural one. 14 Furthermore, the model of the
Staatsnation is not exclusively a Western phenomenon, just as the type of the Kulturna-
tion model is not found only in the East. To be sure, the emergence of countries like the
United States, France, Great Britain, or Switzerland occurred predominantly in the pat-
terns of a Staatsnation. On the other hand, the feeling of a common destiny in the Ger-
man and Italian states rested mainly on language and culture - and thus on the attributes
of a Kulturnation - until their political unifications at the end of the 19th century. 15 Like-
wise, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that lasted from 1569 to the Polish Partitions
in the late 1700s, and of which Belarus was a part (see section III.A3, below), was
clearly articulated as a Staatsnation}6
Hence, certain beliefs about what constitutes a nation are common to both pre-
sented conceptions. According to Anthony Smith, these common beliefs are: (a) The idea
that nations are units of people territorially bounded in a so-called homeland; (b) The
perception that their members share a common culture (language, customs, and tradi-




Urs Altermatt, Op. cit. , p. 30
16
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zens have reciprocal legal rights and duties under a common legal system; and (d) The
notion that nations ensure common socio-economic rights and possess a common econ-
omy. 1
Based on all these aspects, Chapter II will investigate the status of the following
Belarusian variables with regard to their impact on nation building and potential for the
creation of a sense of national uniqueness: (1) Ethno-cultural patterns (Ethnicity, lan-
guage and culture, and historical memory); (2) Institutions and politics; (3) The attitude
of the Belarusians towards their national sovereignty; and (4) Aspects of the Belarusian
economy.
B. ALIGNMENT POLITICS
This section summarizes aspects of the origins of alignments. It investigates what
are - on a theoretical basis - the forces that bring states together and what are the factors
that determine a country to prefer one partner to another. The purpose here is to deter-
mine at the end of Chapter III whether the Belarusian stance toward a merger with Russia
can be explained, and its future attitude predicted, by means of the theory. The section
does not review the motives for, and patterns of, a non-alignment, de-alignment, or rea-
lignment behavior. These aspects of international relations are irrelevant for the Belaru-
sian case study.
17 Anthony Smith, Op. cit . p. 13-14
10
Among the countless books written on the subject, the section focuses on George
Liska's Nations in Alliance and on Stephen Walt's The Origins of Alliances . 18
Alignments are based on ( 1 ) fear, (2) affinities, (3) dependence, or (4) on transna-
tional penetration. In any case, aligning states aim at optimizing their interests. Generally
speaking, it is a question of maximizing gains, minimizing costs, and sharing liabilities. 19
Likewise, "pending the evolution [of the alignment], provisionally disparate interests of
members must be at least compatible with each other and with the maintenance of the
initial interests, if the association is to succeed."
20
( 1 ): In an alignment determined by fear, the triggering factor is the confrontation
by an external threat. Classically, states may either balance or bandwagon. "Balancing is
defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat, while bandwagoning refers to
alignment with the source of danger."
Balancing aims at curbing a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong. A lesser
state has different motives for balancing than a stronger power. The lesser state rallies to
the stronger or a coalition as a reaction against the threat coming from a third country. In
doing so, the perception of the threat has to be stronger than the worry to lose its identity
while aligning. Conversely, the stronger state or the coalition seeks to improve its relative
power and to deny the resources of the aligning state to the potential adversary. Likewise,
18 George Liska, Nations in Alliance - The Limits of Interdependence , Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1962; and Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1987




Stephen Walt, Op. cit.
. p. 17
11
for the admitting body, the alignment has to represent a net gain in power. Otherwise, the
alignment would bring nothing but a dilution or overextension of commitment and re-
sources.
22
By aligning with an offensive greater power, a lesser state acts defensively or of-
fensively. Bandwagoning is first a form of defensive appeasement. It seeks to avoid an
aggression by diverting it elsewhere, and thus to preserve state independence or at least
integrity. Bandwagoning is, second, a form of offensive opportunism. A state may align
with the dominant power to share the fruits of the latter's offensive behavior. 23
(2): In an alignment determined by affinities or "ideological solidarity,"
24
states
ally because they share political, cultural, or other characteristics. The more similar states
are, the more likely they are to align with each other. Hence, the alignment with like
states may first be perceived as a way of defending one's own political principles or cul-
tural patterns. If one's own system is viewed as inherently good, it is good as well to fos-
ter this very system in other states. Second, the alignment may be facilitated by the rela-
tive absence of fear. States with matching characteristics do fear one another to a lesser
extent, because they find it hafd to imagine that another state perceived as "good" will try
to harm them. In other words, the more secure a state feels, the more common affinities
may matter in an alignment choice. Third, states with a poor domestic legitimacy may
seek ideological alignment to enhance external - and domestic - support. However,
George Liska warns that alignment with a greater power often costs status and regime
George Liska, Op. cit. , pp. 13 and 26-27; and Stephen Walt, Op. cit. , pp. 18-19
23
Ibid. (Walt), pp. 19-21
24 Term coined by Hans Morgenthau. Quoted in: Stephen Walt, Op. cit.
, p. 33
12
stability rather than conferring it: "[Alignment] seems to curtail full independence rather
then preventing mere independence from turning into isolation. "2> Finally, the common
ideology itself may simply prescribe an alignment, and thus be less an expression of soli-
darity than of coercion. 26
(3): In an alignment determined by dependence, the aligning states are either mu-
tually or asymmetrically dependent. In case of a mutual dependence, states align if both
parties believe it is in their interest to do so. They will adapt to their partners' interests.
On the other hand, an asymmetrical dependence creates a relation of patron and client
and offers the patron leverage over its client. The degree of leverage obtained by the pa-
tron is directly related to the rate of asymmetry and to the degree of monopoly that the
patron enjoys in the means that creates the dependence. Typically, the dependence is in
the first place an economic one. The leverage is enhanced if the patron is capable of po-
litically manipulating the client's dependence; that is, to turn it into a political one.
27
(4): Finally, in an alignment determined by transnational penetration, the align-
ment is the result of "the manipulation of one state's domestic political system by another
[state]."
28 The penetration may take different forms: Public officials can use their influ-
ence to move their country close to another; lobbyists can try to alter the public percep-
tions and the policy decisions regarding a potential ally; and propaganda can be used to
influence elite and mass attitudes in another country. For Stephen Walt, transnational
George Liska, Op. cit.
. p. 39
26




28 Mi, p. 46
13
penetration is a cause for alignment in only rare circumstances and is most effective when




III. BELARUSIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY
A. ETHNO-CULTURAL PATTERNS
This section will analyze three indicators of Belarusian national identity: ( 1 ) Eth-
nicity, (2) Language and culture, and (3) Historical memory. The more these elements
differ from neighboring peoples, the stronger the perception of a distinct identity will be.
However, it is not so important that the separateness is objectively true. Rather, it matters
that the collective popular mind is convinced of a substantial difference.
For obvious reasons, Belarusian national identity should stand out against Russian
influence. Thus, the following subsections will focus on Belarusian-Russian similarities
and differences.
1. Ethnicity











1897 63.5 5.9 4.9 4.5 14.2 7.0
1926 80.6 7.7 2.0 0.6 8.2 0.9
1959 81.1 8.2 6.7 1.7 1.9 0.4
Table 1/1. Ethnic composition of Belarus JO
30 The data are from: George Sanford, "Belarus on the Road to Nationhood," Survival , Vol. 38,
# 1, Spring 1996, p. 1; and Michael Urban and Jan Zaprudnik, "Belarus: a long road to nation-
hood," in: Ian Bremer and Ray Taras (Eds.), Nations and politics in the Soviet successor states .
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 103 and 1 14
15
Year Indigenous
Ethnic groups in percent of the total population
Russians Poles Ukrainians Jews Others
1979 79.4 11.9 4.2 2.4 1.4 0.7
1989 77.8 13.2 4.1 2.9 1.1 0.9
Table 1/2. Ethnic composition of Belarus
At first glance, Table 1 demonstrates a comfortable majority of Belarusians, a sta-
bility of this majority since the late 1920s, and a substantial distance from the majority to
the second most important ethnic group. The last two facts become all the more evident if













NA Figure not available
Table 2. Russian minorities in Belarus and its neighbor states in 1995 31
31 The data are from: Freedom House, Nations in Transit - Civil Society, Democracy and Mar-
kets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States. New York: Freedom House, Inc..
1995, pp. 32, 85, 91, 102, and 138
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On the other hand, Table 1 shows the swift increase in size of the Russian minor-
ity in the first decades of the 20th century and its constancy thereafter. This reflects the
heavy Russification Belarus experienced under late Tsarism and under Communism. For
George Stanford, the "official Soviet policy succeeded in creating a multi-ethnic and
multilingual Belarusian-Russian mish-mash. (...). [Belarus was] transformed into an in-
termarried, ethnically and linguistically polyglot population."32
One has to remember that, ethno-linguistically, Belarusians, Russians, Ukrainians,
and Carpatho-Rusyns form the so-called East Slavic group. 33 The ethnic identity helps
the Belarusians to demarcate themselves from the Baltic north and from the Polish west,
but not from the Ukrainian south and the Russian east. Ethnically, nothing differentiates
Belarusians from Russians. We have seen in the previous chapter that, if racial differ-
ences are not decisive, ethnic groups structure around systems of cultural regulation. A
wide variety of markers define the ethnies both internally and toward the outside world.
One of the most important markers is the language. Today's Belarusians view themselves
to be ethnically Belarusian if they speak the Belarusian language or one of the many Be-
larusian /?a/ow.
34
32 George Sanford, Op. ciu pp. 134 and 137
Paul Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe, Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1995, pp. 97-99
34 George Sanford, Op. cit. , p. 138
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2. Language and Culture
"Language is not only a means of communication, but also the soul of a nation,
the foundation and the most important part of its culture."35 So begins the January 1990
Law on Languages which, for a short period, made Belarusian the only official language
of the country.
The Belarusian language is an East Slavic tongue. As stated above, it is closely
related to Russian and to Ukrainian. Standard Belarusian uses the Cyrillic alphabet and
was codified in the early 1900s on the basis of a dialect spoken in the country's central
part. Historically, "Old Belarusian" was the official language of the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania of which Belarus was a part until the Polish partitions of the late 1700s. 36 Since
the absorption of the Belarusian territory into the Russian Empire, Belarusian has had a
hard time to maintain itself. Furthermore, while most Belarusians speak their mother
tongue, many of them will not read it. Some are even "ashamed to speak it," because
Belarusian has traditionally been associated with the peasantry. They simply prefer to use
Russian, which is perceived to be the area's linguafranca.
Table 3. summarizes the status of the Belarusian and the Russian languages
throughout the 20th century.
Quoted in: Jan Zaprudnik and Helen Fedor, "Belarus," in: Helen Fedor (Ed). Belarus and
Moldova - Country studies, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Area handbook series,
1995, p. 33
36
Alexander Bely, "Belarus: A Real Or Fictious Nation?" History Today . Vol. 47, # 4, 1 April
1997, p. 5
Belarus's former Prime Minister Vyacheslau Kebich in a speech given in January 1993.
Quoted in: George Sanford, Op. cit. , p. 137
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Era / Date Status of the Belarusian language Status of the Russian language
Pre- 1920s • The Cyrillic script is restricted to
Russian. This bans the printing
of Belarusian in the only widely
comprehensive form
• 1 897: Belarusian is registered as
a distinct language in the first
systematic census of the Russian
Empire
• 1906: The ban on the Belarusian
language is lifted. Restrictions
on its use remain
Belarusian benefits from Lenin's
pluralist New Economic Policy
• Belarusian is favored over Rus-
sian. A flourishing literary life
develops (e.g., the foundation of





Purge of any Belarusian nationalism Russian becomes the most widely
spoken language
Late 1980s • "Letter of the 28" to Gorbachev
in 1986 showing how close Be-
larusian is to "spiritual extinc-
tion"
• Linguistic-political awakening




• The Law on Languages makes
Belarusian the country's official
language
• It commits the government to
the restoration of Belarusian in
education and public life by the
end of the century
Russian becomes the language of
inter-ethnic communication
Table 3/1 . Status of the Belarusian and the Russian languages in the 20th century
31
38 The data are from: Ekkehardt Kraft, "Differenzierte Sprachenpolitik in den fruheren
Sowjetre-publiken - Das Russische spielt nach wie vor eine wesentliche Rolle," Neue Zurcher
Zeitung. international edition # 24, 30 January 1997, p. 7; Ustina Markus, "The Bilingualism
Question in Belarus and Ukraine," Transition. Vol. 2, # 24, 29 November 1996, pp. 18-19 and 64;
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Era / Date Status of the Belarusian language Status of the Russian language
Early 1990s 1 1 percent of the Belarusian popu-
lation is fluent in Belarusian
1992 • 17 percent of polled people fa-
vor Belarusian as sole official
language
• 75 percent favor bilingualism
60 percent of the polled prefer to use
Russian in their daily life
May 1995 A referendum gives Russian back its
parity as an official language
August 1995 A presidential decree orders to re- These schools are to return to using
move all books published between books printed in Russia; that is, to
1992 and 1995 from schools of books written in Russian
higher education
April 1997 The Charter of the Union of Belarus
and Russia states that the working
language of the bodies of the Union
shall be Russian
Today President Lukashenko and most
governmental officials use solely
Russian
Table 3/2. Status of the Belarusian and the Russian languages in the 20th century
The Table not only shows the difficulty Belarusian has existing beside Russian,
but also its struggle to remain a living idiom at all. Hence, being on the defensive, the
vernacular language - like ethnicity - is unable to serve as a factor of national identity. .
The active defenders of the Belarusian language gather around Zyanon Paznyak
and his political party, the Belarusian Popular Front-Revival (BPF). The Law on Lan-
guages was passed in the short-lived spirit of change of the years 1990 and 1991, when
BPF enjoyed some support. We will see in subsection B.2., below, that the popular lack
George Sanford, Op. cit. , pp. 133, 134, 137, 144, and 146; and Jan Zaprudnik and Helen Fedor,
Op. cit.
, pp. xxiii and 33-36
20
of interest in the question of a Belarusian idiom has gone hand in hand with the decrease
in BPF's popular support. Some authors view the nationalists as being "romanticists
[who] see salvation in preserving the language". It cannot be dismissed that the nation-
alist Belarusian opposition concentrates on obviously unsuitable linguistic-cultural fac-
tors instead of emphasizing other elements that could stress a Belarusian national unique-
40
ness.
In this context, it is interesting to record the attitude of the churches. Tradition-
ally, the Orthodox Church preaches in Russian and the Catholic in Polish. Only the Uni-
ate Church is reputed to use Belarusian in its liturgy. Matters are unlikely to change, as
most churchgoers of the two major denominations are Russians and Poles and as Uniate
believers represent a modest number. It is thus improbable that an established denomina-
tion or a religious movement will take the lead in the revival of Belarusian. 41
Because today's Belarus is widely urbanized, many fields of culture - film, theater,
music, and beaux-arts - center on urban or universal concerns. On the other hand, the
written Belarusian culture is primarily associated with peasant ways, folklore, and cus-
toms. This goes back to the 17th and 18th centuries, when Poland and Russia assimilated
the Belarusian nobility into their respective cultures. Rural culture was the starting point
for the development of Belarusian literature in the 19th century and in the 1920s. Most
39
Alexander Bely, Op. cit.
, p. 5
40
BPF's leader Zyanon Paznyak is the archaeologist who has published evidence of the Stalin-
era mass graves found in 1988 (see Table 4/2 below). This event has been a strong motivator for
national independence. It is likely that Paznyak's operational code centers on areas of the hu-
manities and thus narrows his political way of acting
41
Christophe von Werdt, "Wo der Osten den Westen trifft - 400 Jahre Union von Brest in der
Ukraine und in Weissrussland," Neue Zurcher Zeitung
.
international edition # 243, 18 October
1996, p. 25
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classics of modern Belarusian literature deal with rural themes. This has not really
changed for the post-independence authors of the 1990s.42 If written culture centers on
bucolic themes in a mostly urban society, it is unlikely to be widely read. This in turn
fails to serve an idiom that is on the defensive.
3. Historical Memory
From the three factors examined in this section, the collective historical memory
of a people is certainly the most important. Belarus is not the only country to stand out
little against a major power with regard to ethnicity, language, and basic culture. For ex-
ample, other European small states like Austria, Liechtenstein, and - at least in its Ger-
man speaking part - Switzerland have the same ethnic and linguistic background as the
southern Lander of Germany. 43 All these states, however, are unique in that they under-
went distinct histories. The existence of a post-World War I and post-World War II Aus-
tria - or of a Deutsch Osterreich, as it was called after World War I - was a direct conse-
quence of the paramount importance of the former Austrian Empire in the Europeans'
collective memory. It was simply unthinkable to let Austria vanish as a European subject.
After the collapse of Communism, all countries and satellites of the former Em-
pire - to include Russia - were searching for a period in their history that they could use
as the starting point to overcome the totalitarian era or with which they could justify their
independence. Some of these countries were lucky to be granted with the memory of self-
42
Jan Zaprudnik and Helen Fedor, Op. cit. , pp. 40-41
See e.g., Jean and Andre Sellier, Atlas des peuples d'Europe occidentals Paris (France): Edi-
tions La Decouverte, 1995, p. 132
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confidence promoting a historical 'Golden Age'. This was however not the case for Be-
larus.
Table 4 shows a synopsis of some of the most important stages of Belarusian pre-
independence history.
Era / Date Event
Late 1200s to
late 1700s
Belarus shares its historical experience with Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and




Russia acquires the Belarusian territory in the three Polish partitions
Late 1700s to
1918
• Administratively, Belarus becomes the Russian North-western Prov-
ince
• The name Belarus is officially banned
• A cultural nationalism spreads in the years before World War I
December
1917
• Meeting of an All-Belarusian Congress (Rada) to establish a demo-
cratic republican government
• Bolsheviks disband the assembly during its deliberations




• The Rada nullifies the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and proclaims an inde-
pendent Belarusian Democratic Republic
• The Germans guarantee the new state's independence
1 January
1919
After the collapse of the German Empire in November 1918, the Belorus-
sian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) is established by force of arms
March 1921 The Treaty of Riga divides the Belarusian territory in three parts. The
western part becomes Polish, the eastern Russian
December
1922
The BSSR becomes a constituent member of the Soviet Union
Table 4/1. Synopsis of key dates and events in Belarus's pre-independence history
44
44 The data are from: Alexander Bely, Op. cit , pp. 3 and 5-6; Richard Pipes, The Formation of
the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism. 1917-1923 , Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1955, pp. 7 and 9; George Sanford, Op. cit. , pp. 133 and 134; Jan Zaprudnik and Helen
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Era / Date Event
September
1939
Soviet troops move into the western Polish part of the Belarusian territory
June 1941 to
Spring 1944
• Belarus comes under German occupation
• Belarusians organize their own administration




• Sweeping Soviet purges after the reoccupation of the country by the
Red Army
• Intensive Russification to protect Belarus against possible Western
influence




The 1986 Chernobyl catastrophe and the June 1988 discovery of mass
graves from the Stalin-era fuel demands for a radical restructuring of Be-
larus
27 June 1990 The BSSR's Supreme Soviet adopts a declaration of state sovereignty
25 August
1991
Following Lithuania, Latvia, and Ukraine, the Supreme Soviet declares
the Belarusian independence
Table 4/2. Synopsis of key dates and events in Belarus's pre-independence history
If one subtracts the medieval period of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Belarusian
formative historical record is poor.
45
The 1918 republican independence under German
occupation was too short to build any national memory. The proponents of self-
government during World War II either went into exile or succumbed to the Soviet
purges. Thus, for two hundred years, the Belarusian historical memory was shaped by the
Fedor, Op. cit. , pp. 17-25; and Verlag Ploetz (Ed), Per grosse Ploetz - Auszug aus der
Geschichte von den Anfangen bis zur Gegenwart , Wurzburg (Germany): Verlag Ploetz, 1992. pp.
964-65
"Old Belarusian" was the official language of the Grand Duchy. Thus, some Belarusian in-
tellectuals claim Belarus to be the principal spiritual successor of the Grand Duchy. This would
actually represent a potent historical memory
24
perception of belonging to the Russian Empire or to the Soviet Union. Ironically, one
could argue that the Belarusian independence was nothing else than a byproduct of the
implosion of the Soviet Union and of the swifter declarations of independence of its
neighbors. Belarus has actually been a "follower". 46
Adradzennie or Revival, a movement for the restoration of a sense of Belarusian
identity, had some success during the immediate post-independence impetus. This
proved, however, to be rather ephemeral. Alexander Bely uses the term of "national ni-
hilism" to describe the indifference of the Belarusians for their vernacular language and
their history.
47
Seemingly, the "ethnic, linguistic, [and historical] affinities between Rus-
sia and Belarus played the most important role"48 in Belarus's spiritual Russification and
in its today's "nostalgia for the Soviet era".
49
B. INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICS
Following the implosion of the Soviet Union, several Newly Independent States
undertook a more or less successful transition to, and consolidation of, democracy.
Though any democratization process is welcome per se, the question in the context of
this thesis is not whether the Belarusian transition has been successful. Rather, this sec-
46
Lithuania repudiated the 1940 "absorption" by the Soviet Union in March 1990; the Soviet
Union recognized its independence on 6 September 1991. Latvia declared independence on 21
August 1991; Ukraine did so on 24 August. In: Arthur Banks, Alan Day, and Thomas Muller
(Eds), Political Handbook of the World: 1995-1996. Binghamton: CSA Publications, State Uni-
versity ofNew York, 1996, pp. 561, 563, and 977
47
Alexander Bely, Op. cit , p. 4
48
Vasil Bykau, Belarusian writer, quoted in: Elena Chinyaeva, "Belarus's "National Con-




tion investigates whether and how Belarusian institutions and politics affect the country's
move toward independence or toward an association with Russia.
The section will focus on: (1) The constitutional framework; (2) The division of
power in the state's corporate bodies; (3) Political rights and civil liberties; (4) National
military independence; and (5) Belarus's foreign relations.
1. The Constitutional Framework
A new post-Communist Belarusian Constitution secured legislative approval on
15 March 1994 and entered into force on 30 March of the same year. 50 The document
conjures up the "centuries-long history of development of Belarusian statehood," 51 tasks
the "Republic (...) [to] defend its independence [by implementing] an independent for-




Developments in various Newly Independent States have shown that countries
that have completed constitutional reform do not necessarily have a better record in plu-
ralism than states that have not seen the adoption of a new basic law. In this respect, Be-
larus is no exception. Especially since the amendments to the Constitution after the No-
vember 1996 referendum, the Belarusian basic law grants enormous power to the presi-
The legislative approval was given by the Supreme Soviet elected in spring 1990 tinder So-
viet election rules
31
N.N., Constitution of the Republic of Belarus , N.P.: N.N. (Xeroxed document), 27 November
1996, provided by the Embassy of the Republic of Belarus to the United States, p. 1. preamble
52
Ibid., p. 1, Article 1
53
Ibid., p. 10. Article 79
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dent of the Republic. 34 Hence, "the preservation of the [state] sovereignty" quoted above
rests mainly on the president's personality and politics. It is well known that President
Lukashenko strives for close ties between Belarus and Russia. Constitutionally, this
course is backed by an article that foresees that the "Republic of Belarus in conformity
with principles of international law may on a voluntary basis enter interstate formations
and withdraw from them." 55 In addition, the Constitution grants the president the sole
right "to conduct negotiations and sign international treaties." 56
It must again be stressed that the nature of the Belarusian regime is not to be as-
sessed here. Rather, the following subsection will determine how well state officials take
care of the "Republic's independence and sovereignty". Then, it will investigate how well
- institutionally - the Belarusian national movement is able to promote its beliefs. Fi-
nally, it records the amount of popular support - expressed as voter share - of the nation-
alists.
2. The State's Corporate Bodies
Article 6 of the Constitution states that "state power in the Republic of Belarus is
exercised on the principle of division of powers between the legislature, executive, and
judiciary. State bodies (...) shall co-operate among themselves acting on the principle of
checks and balances." This is pure window dressing since the very same Constitution
54
For a complete listing of the presidential prerogatives, see: Ibid. , Chapter 3 "The President of
the Republic of Belarus", pp. 10-13, Articles 79 to 89
55
Ibid. , p. 2, Article 8
56
Ibid, p. 11, Article 84
20
57
Ibid., p. 1, Article 6
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allows the executive to heavily interfere with the two other branches of power. Since the
November 1996 referendum, the president appoints directly eight of 68 members of the
Council of the Republic (the parliament's upper chamber), has the right to dissolve either
chamber of the parliament, appoints six of nine members of the Constitutional Court, in-
cluding its chairperson, appoints the judges of the Supreme and the Economic Courts,
including their chairpersons, and has the right to dismiss the chairpersons and the judges
of any of the three courts. 58 In addition, the president can bypass the Legislature by issu-
ing decrees and by calling national referenda on "important issues of the State and soci-
ety."
59 A decision adopted by a referendum can only be reversed or amended by another
referendum.60 It is obvious that these provisions neutralize any checks and balances and
deliver the state to the executive.
It has been stated in the previous section that the Belarusian national movement
rests mainly on the BPF party. In this respect, it is interesting to look at BPF's election
results. Table 5 summarizes the 1990 and 1995 legislative elections.
BPF won 34 (or 37) seats against an overwhelming Communist majority in the
1990 elections. This was considered to be an astounding success and lent wings to the
movement. The 1995 elections were disappointing. Having opposed the government's
policy of close alignment with Russia, BPF failed to win representation.
The appointments of the chairpersons of the three courts and the nomination of the judges of
the Supreme and Economic Courts require the consent of the Council of the Republic. See. Ibid. ,
pp. 1 1 and 13, Articles 84 and 91
59
Ibid. , pp. 9 and 1 1 , Articles 73 and 85
60
Ibid.
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18 3 5 10
05.28.
1995
101 24 25 2 6 44
11.29.
1995




CPB Communist Party (of Belarus) 1 PPA Party of Popular Accord
BPF Belarusian Popular Front Revival Indep. Independents; no party affiliation
APB Agrarian Party of Belarus ND Not determinable
1 The Soviet-era Communist Party was suspended after the declaration of independence.
It was re-legalized as Communist Party of Belarus in February 1993
Table 5. Results of the 1990 and 1995 legislative elections to the unicameral Supreme
Soviet and Council, respectively 61
Table 6 shows the results of the 1994 presidential elections. The score of BPF's
candidate was disappointing. Zyanon Paznyak reached 14 percent in the first ballot and
was eliminated from the second ballot.
61 Numbers vary according to the sources (e.g., the number of BPF seats in the 1990 parlia-
ment). The data are from: Arthur Banks, Alan Day, Thomas Muller (Eds), Op. cit. , pp. 83-85;
Freedom House, Op. cit. , p. 32; Ustina Markus, "A New Parliament, Despite the President,"






Vote share of the candidates (percent)
V. Kebich, Z. Paz- S. Shuske- A. Dubko,





23 June 44.8 17.3 13.9 9.9 6.2 4.6
10 July 80 20
BPR Belarusian Patriotic Movement BSDP Belarusian Social Democratic Party
PMB Popular Movement of Belarus BPP Belarusian Peasant's Party
BPF Belarusian Popular Front Revival CPB Communist Party of Belarus
Table 6. Results of the 1994 presidential elections 62
While the parties that support national independence or reforms won about ten
percent of the seats in the 1990 Supreme Council 6\ they scored 30 percent in the first
ballot of the 1994 presidential elections. 64 In the elections to the 1995 Supreme Council,
they occupied roughly seven percent of the seats. 65
Until recently, the great unknown in the Belarusian political landscape at the Re-
public level was the large number of so-called 'independent' deputies with no party af-
62 Numbers vary according to the sources. The total of the first ballot vote shares accounts to
less than 100 percent. Data are from: George Sanford, Op. cit , p. 145
63
That is, the 34 (or 37) seats of BPF
64
That is, the vote shares of Z. Paznyak from BPF, S. Shuskevich from BSDP and A. Dubko
from BPP. The Belarusian Social Democratic Party (BSDP) was founded 1991. It sees itself as a
revival of the revolutionary Hramada party which was founded in 1902, pushed for the 1918
creation of an independent state, and was outlawed after the creation of the BSSR in 1919. The
Belarusian Peasant's Party (BPP) was founded 1990. It aims at the restoration of peasant land
ownership. It is loosely associated with BPF. See: Arthur Banks, Alan Day, Thomas Muller
(Eds.), Op. cit. . p. 84
That is, those of the Party of Popular Accord (PPA). The technocratic PPA stands for eco-
nomic reforms. It is independent of the reformists' alliance but backed the presidential BPF can-
didate in 1994. See: Ibid
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filiation (see Table 5 above). Thus, the real political weight of the nationalists was diffi-
cult to assess, too. Yet, the constitutional amendments after the November 1996 referen-
dum have completely changed the scene. One of the propositions called for reducing the
number of deputies and transforming the unicameral Supreme Council in a bicameral
National Assembly. This transformation occurred within days after the referendum. The
organization of the Assembly is shown in Table 7.




First session convened on
28 November 1996
110 Pavel Shypuk ' • Chosen among the
deputies of the former
Supreme Council
• A new electoral law is
pending
Council of the Republic
(Upper House)
First session convened on
11 January 1997




• 8 councilors are nomi-
nated by the president
Former leader of the Belorussian Communist Party and former member of the/?o//Y-
buro of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Table 7. The formation of a bicameral National Assembly in November 1996 66
The party composition of the two chambers is unknown. 67 One has however to
assume that the deputies chosen to sit in the Assembly are compliant with President Lu-
66
Personal communication from the Embassy of the Republic of Belarus to the United States,
14 February 1997
"No data as to the seats per political parties in the National Assembly is available." Personal
communication from the Embassy of the Republic of Belarus to the United States, 14 February
1997
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kashenko's will. 68 So, for example, 60 deputies of the former Supreme Council who are
not members of the new Assembly regularly meet as a sign of silent protest against their
removal from the Legislature. 69 Hence, for the near future, any legislative resistance to
the political course has been muzzled and the nationalist opposition is no longer able to
influence the country's legislation and official political life at the Republic level.
In the prelude to the November 1996 referendum, the quarrel between the presi-
dent and the Constitutional Council became obvious. The council charged Lukashenko
with anti-constitutional behavior in not less than 17 cases. The council's president, Va-
leryi Tikhinya, openly accused the president of attempting "to establish a totalitarian re-
gime with all its attributes: an emasculated Parliament and a Constitutional Council put in
the president's pocket."
70
Furthermore, he warned against a "legal Chernobyl." The con-
stitutional amendments following the latest referendum granted President Lukashenko the
right to appoint the Constitutional Council's chairperson. Tikhinya was removed from
office on the spot and replaced by Grigory Vasilevich. 71 In addition, five of the 1 1 Con-
stitutional Court justices resigned. This opened the way for Lukashenko to appoint his
68
eg., "Gefestigte Position Lukaschenkos in Minsk," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, international edi-
tion # 279, 29 November 1996, p. 3
69
eg, "Verhaftungen bei Demonstrationen in Minsk - Warnungen Washingtons an das Lu-
kaschenko-Regime," Neue Zurcher Zeitung. international edition # 63, 17 March 1997, p. 2
7ft Quoted in: wan., "Lukaschenkos Intngen gegen das Parlament," Neue Zurcher Zeitung . inter-
national edition # 240, 15 October 1996, p. 2
71
eg., "Friedhofsruhe mit Storungen in Weissrussland - Schikanierung der Opposition und
zahlreiche Entlassungen," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, international edition # 49, 28 February 1997, p.




own people to the court. * Thus, despite the existence of a formal Belarusian constitu-
tionalism, one cannot assume any more that there is an official body that monitors the
constitutionality of the bills passed by the new Legislature or of the presidential decrees.
This merely adds another element of arbitrariness and unpredictability to Belarusian
politics.
3. Political Rights and Civil Liberties
National identity is not only nurtured by abstract factors like historical memory.
Rather, for the average citizen, personal rights and liberties and personal inviolability are
more important. If they are perceived to be favorable, they certainly foster his support
and 'affection' for the state. Table 8 summarizes the Belarusian status of some political
rights and civil liberties.
Criterion Positive areas Negative areas
Human Rights Section II of the Constitution is
an impressive Bill of Rights. It
guarantees all of the rights and
freedoms contained in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human
Rights
Bureaucratic resistance to relig-
ion in general and toward the
major churches and the Jewish
community in particular
Political Rights Belarusian citizens vote at the
age of 18 and are eligible at the
age of 21
Table 8/1 . Survey of the status of some Belarusian political rights and civil liberties 73
72
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Ustina Markus, "Belarus Chooses Dictatorship," Transition , Vol. 3, # 2, 7 February 1997, p.
The data of the table are gathered from: Freedom House, Op. cit. , pp. 5, 8, and 33-37; Bruno
Henggi, "Durftige weissrussische Presselandschaft," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, international edition
# 117, 22 May 1996, p. 9; and Ustina Markus, "Belarusian Media Struggle Under Authoritarian
Rule," Transition . Vol. 2, # 21, 18 October 1996, pp. 57-59 and 80
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Criterion Positive areas Negative areas
Rule of Law • The courts of the three-tiered
judicial system are not di-
rectly linked to the Ministry
of Justice
• The state provides free public
defenders
• The reform of the Criminal
Code is still underway
• The Ministry of Justice pro-
vides the courts with techni-
cal and financial assistance
• The judges are influenced by
the political leadership, espe-
cially in rural areas
• Only one third of all lawyers
are in private practice (1994)
Local Self-
Government
• Articles 117 and 118 of the
Constitution grant local gov-
ernment and read that local
councils of deputies shall be
popularly elected
• Article 122 grants local ju-
risdiction
• Article 121 defines local
budgets, taxes, and dues as
being the competence of the
local councils of deputies
Article 119 of the Constitution
gives the president of the Re-
public the right to appoint and to
dismiss the heads of local ex-




• Article 13 of the Constitution
guarantees private property
• A law on the privatization of
state assets has been passed
• The same Article 13 of the
Constitution lays down that
arable land is state property
• Only 1 percent of the arable
land is leased or privately
owned (1994)
• Only 5 to 10 percent of the
GDP are generated by the
private sector (Belarus ranks
last from all Newly Inde-
pendent States and Central
European former Soviet sat-
ellites)
Table 8/2. Survey of the status of some Belarusian political rights and civil liberties
34




• Less than 14 percent of state
property have been privat-
ized (1996)
• In the November 1996 refer-
endum, the electors turned
down the question on the
proposition on private land
property
Trade Unions • There are two free trade un-
ions, the Free Trade Union of
Belarus (SPB) and the Be-
larusian Independent Trade
Union (BNP)
• Their total membership
amounts 25,000 (1994)
• The Federation of Trade
Unions of Belarus (FTUB), a
former branch of the Soviet
All-Union Central Council of
Trade Unions, claims five
million members
• FTUB represents 90 percent
of the unionized workers
• Together with Georgia and
Uzbekistan, Belarus shows
the least percentage of work-
ers belonging to new unions
Media • Article 33 of the Constitution
guarantees free expression
and forbids the monopoliza-
tion of the mass media or
censorship either by the state,
public associations or indi-
viduals
• The Russian NTV television
is well received in Belarus
and reports regularly on Be-
larusian subjects
• A presidential decree of
March 1995 On Cases of Le-
gal Violations ofMass Media
created a supervisory council
to monitor the media
• Radio Minsk, Belarus Tele-
vision and the Belta news
agency are under state con-
trol
• The Sowjetskaja Belarussija
(circulation 200,000) and the
Narodnaja Gaseta (circula-
tion 300,000) are under state
power and subsidized with
state funds
Table 8/3. Survey of the status of some Belarusian political rights and civil liberties
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Criterion Positive areas Negative areas
Media • The opposition weekly Swa-
(Cont.) boda (circulation 100,000)
has to be printed in Vilnius.
The power refuses it printing
capacities
Table 8/4. Synoptic survey of the status of some political rights and civil liberties
While there is good evidence that the Belarusian experiences personal freedom,
formal democratic political rights, and a fair jurisdiction, the record for the other criteria
is less favorable. At the local level, the citizen may meet the same arbitrariness in politi-
cal and administrative matters as on the Republic level. Access to property is not easy.
Though not really restricted, access to free or uncensored media is difficult. The only lib-
erty that Belarusians do not take advantage of, is the membership in free unions. This is
symptomatic of the general popular apathy that will be further investigated in the fol-
lowing section below.
4. National Military Independence
State sovereignty is intimately associated with military independence. After the
implosion of the Soviet Union, one of the main concerns of the Newly Independent States
was to get rid of Soviet troops and military assets stationed on their soil, to assume the
control of their borders, to build up indigenous armed and police forces, and - where nec-
essary - to de-Russify the officer corps. This extrication process proved to be extremely
difficult.
36
In the context of the Soviet offensive military doctrine, the conventional forces
were designed to invade Europe. Thus, Belarus's geostrategic position made it the gate-
way to the West. The country was highly militarized. The 243,000 Soviet troops stationed
in Belarus accounted for one soldier for every 43 of its population, compared to one per
98 in Ukraine and one per 634 in Russia. In addition, the country hosted 23 nuclear-
missile bases and a total of 81 intercontinental SS-25 ballistic missiles. 74
The July 1990 declaration of state sovereignty theoretically gave the Supreme So-
viet control over all foreign armed forces based on Belarusian territory. The August 1991
declaration of independence and Article 1 8 of the Constitution commits the country to
become neutral and nuclear-free. So far, however, Belarus has not formulated a new na-
tional security strategy or any kind of binding schedule for the steps to be taken in the
security sphere.
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Nevertheless, regarding national military independence, the concrete
achievements are substantial though not free from contradiction.
In May 1992, Belarus abolished the Belarusian Military District and subordinated
all troops on its soil to its own Ministry of Defense. The same month, Belarus became
party to the Lisbon Protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) which laid
down the procedure for returning its strategic nuclear missiles to Russia. Still in May
1992, it refused to sign the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) Treaty on Col-
74 George Sanford, Op. cit. , pp. 141-42
Anatolii Rozanov mentions a document on Belarusian military doctrine adopted by the Su-
preme Soviet in December 1992 but never published in extenso. The author views the document
to be "only an interim statement." He warns not "to overestimate [the paper's] significance and
real meaning." See: Anatolii Rozanov, "Belarusian Perspectives on National Security and Belaru-
sian Military Policy," in: Bruce Parrott (Ed), State-Building and Military Power in Russia and the
New States of Eurasia Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1995, p. 199
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lective Security, arguing that unattached armed forces were essential to maintaining the
country's independence.
The Belarusian armed forces officially came into existence on 1 January 1993.
Since then the ground forces have been reduced to about 50,000 and the air force person-
nel to 16,000. At the end of 1992, ethnic Russians accounted for nearly half the Belaru-
sian conscripts and some 80 percent of the officer corps. Today's ethnic composition of
the Belarusian forces is unknown. It is however likely that the substantial drawdown has
gone hand in hand with a de-Russification. 77
Belarus started to assume control over its borders in early 1993. Customs-posts on
the borders of Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine were established by mid- 1993. The density
of guards on the Polish frontier was decreased by about one half compared to Soviet
times. However, it was assumed that guards on the border with Russia would be seen as
provocative. The border guards are under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
In February 1993, the Supreme Soviet ratified the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START I) and approved adherence to the NPT. By mid- 1993, all tactical nuclear
weapons were removed from Belarus. 79 Since the CIS Charter adopted in January 1993
confirmed the sovereign equality of its members and its lack of supranational power, the
Belarusian Supreme Soviet decided to accede to the CIS Treaty on Collective Security -
76 George Sanford, Op. cit. , p. 142; and Jan Zaprudnik and Helen Fedor, Op. cit. , pp. 83 and 87-
88
77
Jan Zaprudnik and Helen Fedor, Op. cit.
, p. 83
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George Sanford, Op. cit. , p. 141
Jan Zaprudnik and Helen Fedor, Op. cit. , p. 87. George Sanford Op.cit , p. 142, dates the final
removal to July 1992
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despite the official negative position in 1992 - with the restriction that Belarusian troops
would never serve beyond the Republic's borders. Belarus is member of the North At-
lantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program
in January 1995.
Finally, it seems that Belarus became a nuclear-free state by the end of 1996. The
Russian defense minister, General Pavel Grachev, attended a ceremony at Lida on 26




The United States recognized Belarus on 26 December 1991. 82 The independent
country established itself on the international scene quite quickly. By the end of 1992,
about 100 countries had recognized Belarus and 70 of them had established some level of
diplomatic relations with it. Belarus in turn set up some 30 embassies abroad. By 1995,
Belarus was member of a number of international organizations, including the United
Nations (of which it was a founding member), the World Bank, the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF), the CIS (also of which it was a founding member), the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly CSCE), and the European Bank for
80
Anatolii Rozanov, Op. cit. , pp. 196-97
81
eg., "Kritische Tone iiber Lukaschenko in Moskau," Neue Ziircher Zeitung, international edi-
tion # 271, 20 November 1996, p. 5; and eg., Op. cit. (reference 68), p. 3
82
Switzerland did so on 23 December 1991
39
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). It has been stated above that Belarus is a
NACC member and that it has joined PfP.
a. The West
The West has favorably yet not uncritically supported Belarus until re-
cently. The worsening of the human rights situation and the regime's authoritarianism
however have gradually cooled off the West's sympathy toward Belarus.
In 1993, in addition to a previously-granted sum of $1 1 million, the United
States offered $ 65 million in aid and technical assistance following the Belarusian ratifi-
cation of START I and the NPT. 84 Since 1995, however, the American-Belarusian rela-
tions have cooled off and reached a temporary low this spring. On 14 March 1997, a
spokesman of the US State Department connected the American attitude toward Belarus
with the "Belarusian behavior and the way the state does treat its citizens". 85 He further
declared that though the number of US embassy personal in Minsk would remain un-
changed, "the diplomatic relations [between the two countries] would be lowered to an
absolute minimum." 86 On 24 March, Belarus declared Serge Alexandrow, First Secretary
of the US Embassy in Minsk, persona non grata for having attended one of the Belaru-
sian opposition's protest rallies. The measure came only days after the expulsion of Peter
Byrnes, the American manager of the Soros Foundation and the search of the founda-
83 To name the most importants. An exhaustive list is given in: Central Intelligence Agency,
World Factbook 1995
.
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995, p. 40
84
Anatolii Rozanov, Op. cit.
, p. 195. Jan Zaprudnik and Helen Fedor, Op. cit. , p. 80 indicate 8.3
million and 100 million dollars, respectively




tion's office. Meanwhile, the United States has frozen its $ 40 million in financial aid for
1 997. 87
Relations with the Western European states follow more or less the same
pattern. After a period of ostensible good will, the relations with Belarus worsened be-
cause of the reasons mentioned above. So, for example, Switzerland granted Belarus 12.3
million francs foreign aid for medical and environmental projects between 1994 and
1996. In addition, this country created a 20 million francs fund for export crediting. In
December 1996, however, Switzerland decided to phase out the current aid and not to
enter new engagements toward Belarus until further notice. 88 On various occasions, the
European Union (EU) has discreetly but unmistakably expressed its unease with the Be-
larusian state of affairs. On 1 7 October 1 996, the ambassadors of France, Germany, Italy,
and the United Kingdom handed over a note to the Belarusian Foreign Ministry directed
on
against President Lukashenko's dictatorial endeavor. The Council of Europe declares
Belarus to be ineligible for membership because of democratic shortcomings. Following
the November 1996 referendum that it sees to lack any legitimacy, the Council recently
froze Belarus's status as "special guest" granted in November 1992. 90 At the Lisbon
OSCE summit in December 1996, President Lukashenko was snubbed by all European
wdn., "Minsk weist weiteren amerikanischen Burger aus - Lukaschenko wittert auslandische
Verschworungen," Neue Zurcher Zeitung. international edition # 70, 25 March 1997, p. 3
88
Personal communication from the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Trade, section of Finan-
cial Aid to the CIS Countries (Bundesamt fur Aussenwirtschaft, Sektion Finanzhilfe fur GUS-
Staaten), 10 March 1997
wdn., "Protestnote der EU gegen Lukaschenko," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, international edition
# 243, 18 October 1996, p. 7
uth., "Sanktion des Europarats gegen Weissrussland," Neue Zurcher Zeitung. international
edition # 11, 15 January 1997, p. 7
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leaders, with the exception of Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. 91 By the end of
1996, the European Parliament condemned the Belarusian regime and proposed a suspen-
sion of all EU aid except for projects committed to the promotion of democracy and the
freedom of the press. 92 Finally, Germany recently cut the 1997 Belarusian amount of its
Hermes Fund for export crediting. 93
The consequence of these mutual measures is obvious. It contributes to the
sealing off of Belarus from the West and the reduction of this country's options for its
international reorientation, while pushing it into Moscow's arms. It is thus no surprise that
President Lukashenko misuses his difficulties with the Western countries to portray a
vague conspiracy aimed at deposing him and at ruining the Belarusian economy. Re-
mindful of old Soviet paranoia, the conspiracy's wirepullers are said to be - in a strange
jumble - the American CIA, the World Bank, the IMF, Polish, Ukrainian and Belarusian
civic action groups, and the Russian television networks. 94
b. The Neighbors
Regarding Belarus's attitude toward national independence, the country's
relation to its eastern neighbor, Russia, is of paramount importance. This relationship will
be portrayed in Chapter IV below. This subsection deals with Belarus's other direct
neighbors.
91 Vadim Dubnov, "The Summit of Lukashenko's Ambition - The Belorussian experiment of
Alexander Lukashenko. The building of the Soviet Union in a separately taken country," New
Times, January 1997, p. 45
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wdn.. Op. cit. (reference 87), p. 3
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The relations with Latvia are serene. The border is unchanged from that
established in 1940 and free of controversy. The two countries have signed a number of
agreements, including one that implies the respect of the mutual minorities.
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The immediate post-independence attitude of Belarus toward Lithuania
was unhappy. The country claimed a strip of Lithuanian territory, including the capital,
Vilnius. The quarrel was settled when the two countries signed a border agreement in
December 1991. Thereafter, the unmarked border between the two states was demarcated
to prevent any further disputes. In February 1995, the two countries signed a friendship
and cooperation treaty. 96
Polish-Belarusian relations have traditionally been free of problems. In
neither country are the large minorities of the other's ethnic group a problem. The two
states signed a friendship and cooperation treaty in June 1992. In May 1996, however, the
good understanding between the two countries suffered. Four leading members of Po-
land's Solidarity Union were arrested for addressing Belarusian workers outside of Minsk
(see Table 1 1 below). They were detained several hours after their arrest, and one of
them, Solidarity leader Marian Krzaklewski, was taken to court for interference in Be-
larus's internal affairs.
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Belarus and Ukraine are on good terms but the ties between the two coun-
tries are weak because of their opposite views of, and relations with, Russia. Ukraine
strives a resolute course for political and military independence and for close ties with the
Jan Zaprudnik and Helen Fedor, Op. cit. , p. 80
96
Ibid., p. 82
Ustina Markus, Op. cit. (reference 72), p. 28
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West. Often, when differences with Russia occur, the one country takes a position in op-
position to that of the other. The most important issue between the two countries is the
Chernobyl power plant. Belarus suffered more than any other country from the 1986 ca-
tastrophe. Thus, it has a strong interest in the definite shutdown of the plant and has been
annoyed by the Ukrainian decision to keep it running. As for Poland, Belarusian-
Ukrainian relations became strained in May 1996 after the Minsk Chernobyl rally (see
Table 1 1 below). Among those arrested, there were seven Ukrainians. Despite Kiev's me-
diation, the seven were sentenced and imprisoned.
All in all, the record shows unproblematic foreign relations. The ties be-
tween Belarus and its neighbors are loose, however. The Baltic States and Ukraine deci-
sively aim at a Western integration, and thus have little sympathy with Belarus's opposite
goal. Furthermore, as stated in the Introduction, Belarus's neighbors would perceive a
Belarusian-Russian unification as a threat to their sovereign independence. Thus, they
carefully watch the relations of Belarus to its former hegemon and react with some irrita-
tion to the intermittent heralding of plans for a merger of the two East-Slavic states.
C. THE ATTITUDE OF THE BELARUSIANS
Actors are more important than factors. In other words, the attitude of people to-
wards an issue is key for its outcome. The following section investigates the stance of the
Belarusians on the country's total independence. To come to the point, the Belarusians's
indifference, profound conservatism, and their nostalgia for pre-independence conditions





According to Michael Burton et ai, elites are persons who regularly and substan-
tially affect political outcomes. Elites are not a specific strata of society - for instance the
intelligentsia - but rather, the principal decisionmakers in the "largest or most resource-
rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, and cul-
tural organizations and movements in a society." 99 Thus, in a pluralistic society, elites are
located both within, and in opposition to, a regime.
The character and the goals of the elites in an immediate post-independence pe-
riod are important in determining how, and at what speed, national sovereignty will be
asserted. The Belarusian problem is that in most spheres of public life the old Soviet
elites have not been ousted. They are very hesitant to commit themselves to the idea of
national independence and continue to see the country's future in the framework of Rus-
sian-dominated arrangements.
We have seen in section B.2. above, that, politically, the opposition has been
muzzled. BPF and other reformist movements are no longer able to "regularly and sub-
stantially" affect political outcomes. In spring 1996, President Lukashenko issued an ar-
rest warrant for Zyanon Paznyak, and for BPF's spokesman, Syarhei Naumchyk. The two
opposition leaders went first into hiding. Later, they fled the country, made their way to
the United States and were granted political asylum in July. 100 More recently, BPF's dep-
Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, "Introduction: Elite Transformations and
Democratic Regimes." in: John Higley and Richard Gunther (Eds.), Elites and Democratic Con-
solidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992,
p. 8
100
Ustina Markus, Op cit.
,
(reference 72), p. 28
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uty chairman, Yuri Khodyko, has been arrested and condemned to five days of impris-
onment after the protest rally of 15 March 1997. 101
Another phenomenon is that more and more members of the ruling elite close to
the president are resigning, joining the opposition or going into exile. So, for example,
Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir and Labor Minister Aleksandr Sesnow resigned on 18
November 1996 to express their discontent with the presidential referendum. They both
joined the opposition. 102 In March 1997, Boris Barichin and Alexandr Burikow, two con-
fidants of President Lukashenko and members of his 1994-election campaign team, asked
for political asylum in Russia. 103 Hence, the inner power circle at the republic level
gradually shrinks to a group of persons completely in line with the stance of the presi-
dent.
Because of its quasi-dictatorial power and the step-by-step elimination of the op-
position, much rests on the personality of President Lukashenko. The former director of a
kolkhoz is a dubious figure. Lukashenko has a flair for reading the moods of the man of
the street. Though challenged by a minority, he is Belarus's most popular politician and
primarily an answer to the Belarusians' nostalgic post-Soviet complexes. His populism -
"a peculiar charisma made of joviality and provincial arrogance" 104 - lacks any reasoned
101
eg., Op. cit. (reference 69), p. 2
102
eg, "Regierungschef in Minsk bietet Rucktritt an," Neue Ziircher Zeitung, international edi-
tion # 270, 19 November 1996, p. 2
103
wdn., "Kritik der Opposition in Minsk an Lukashenko," Neue Ziircher Zeitung. international
edition # 72, 27 March 1997, p. 2
104
R.M., "Zwischen Lenin und Lukaschenko in Minsk - Weissrusslands President ist nur von
Moskau zu beeindrucken," Neue Ziircher Zeitung , international edition # 274, 23 November
1996, p. 11
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strategy. Rather, he acts impulsively and with volatility. As we know, the idea to formally
unite Belarus and Russia was initiated by Lukashenko. Yet, his real posture towards a
union with Russia is unclear. While for some commentators there is no doubt that the
Belarusian president aims at a complete reintegration of his country into the Russian Fed-
eration, others view his behavior to be pure rhetorical opportunism. 105
We have seen above that the latest amendments to the Constitution and the trans-
formation of the Legislature have created an elite at the republic level that is compliant
with the president's will. Through the so-called "presidential or executive vertical" the
president has a strong hold on the local elites, too. 106 It has been stated in section B.3.
above, that the president has the right to appoint and to dismiss the heads of local execu-
tive and administrative bodies. Recent data on the stance of local politicians is scarce. A
1995 review published by two Belarusian sociologists presents findings that have been
gathered between 1991 and 1993. The average interviewed politician in that study had
worked in the local political power structure for 15 years and held his current position for
7.3 years. The initial survey was repeated after two years. Results are only from incum-
bents who could be interviewed twice. Though not dealing with the question of state in-
105 Some facts should not be forgotten: In 1991, Lukashenko was among the 18 deputies of the
Belarusian Supreme Soviet to vote against the liquidation of the Soviet Union. After his election
to the presidency in 1994, he proclaimed union with Russia the strategic aim of his policy. In
spring 1995, he launched a referendum that - among other questions - asked for an 'Economic
Integration with Russia'. In 1996, he was the sole CIS president to refuse to back Yeltsin in the
run-up to the first round of the Russian presidential elections. In: Vadim Dubnov, "Lukashenko:
Hell-Bent on Increasing His Powers," New Times. December 1996, p. 39
106 Vadim Dubnov, Op. cit. (reference 91), p. 44; and eg., "Weissrusslands President am
langeren Hebel - Trotz gesunkener Beliebtheit noch immer popular," Neue Ziircher Zeitung , in-
ternational edition # 270, 19 November 1996, p. 9
47
dependence, some answers reveal the local elites' fundamental stance. They are repro-

















1991 -2.3 -2.6 2.3 -0.2 4.7
1993 -2.5 -2.6 2.6 0.1 0.1 4.8
A positive score means acceptance. A negative score means rejection. A score of zero
shows indifference
Table 9. Importance of some values for Belarusian local elites 107
Elites who reject "equality" are not on the way to democracy. Leaders who reject
"political participation" and support "localism" in a half-hearted way are certainly not
inclined to back self-responsibility, which is a prerequisite for national independence. On
the other hand, the strong support for "economic development" - in however a non-
capitalistic way - is symptomatic. Independence shall provide a better material standard
of living without changing the rules of the game. If this is not achievable one appeals ei-
ther to an allegedly strong leader or to the traditional "big brother" for help.
107 The data are rearranged from: Jane Grichtchenko and A. Gristanov, "The Local Political Elite
in the Democratic Transformation of Belarus," The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science. Vol. 540, July 1995, pp. 121-24
48
2. The people
The attitude of the Belarusian people, especially the one expressed at the ballot
box, is clear-cut. The vast majority is conservative, while a minority challenges the status
quo.
Since 1991, Belarusians have been repeatedly called to express their will and
preferences by voting. Usually, the turnout was high enough to view the results as the
manifestation of a broad popular consensus. 108 The results of these popular consultations










All-Union referendum on the pres-





• increased presidential preroga-
tives, including the right to dis-
solve the Supreme Soviet
64.7
77.7
NA Figure not available
Table 10/1. The attitude of the Belarusian people at the ballot box 109
108
It should however be stated that the lawfulness of at least the 23 November 1996 referendum
is questionable. Two weeks before the referendum, President Lukashenko fired Viktor Hanchar,
chairman of the Central Electoral Commission. The president set up his own regional commis-
sions to oversee the poll, while ignoring the official commission. The polling stations were open
since 9 November; that is, for more than two weeks. Some of them did not even have the text of
the referenda questions. Rather, they displayed samples of ballot papers showing how to vote 'for'
the president and 'against' the Supreme Council. The OSCE refused to send observers to monitor
the referendum to avoid lending legitimacy to the poll. See: Vadim Dubnov, Op. cit. (reference
91), p. 44; and Ustina Markus, "A War of Referenda in Belarus," Transition, Vol. 2, #25, 13 De-
cember 1 996, p. 15
109 The data are from: eg., "Referendum in Weissrussland abgehalten," Neue Zurcher Zeitung,
international edition # 275, 25 November 1996, p. \;eg., "Dubioser Sieg Lukaschenkos in Weiss-
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tional Holiday '
• the abolition of the death pen-
alty
• the right to private land prop-
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3 July is the anniversary of Minsk's liberation by the Red Army in 1944
Table 10/2. The attitude of the Belarusian people at the ballot box
The verdict could not be clearer. Obviously, Belarusians advocate a strong con-
servative course with a tendency to return to pre-independence conditions and are reluc-
tant to move along the road to more democracy and liberties. Moreover, in an opinion
Ritsuko Sasaki, "Referenda - a Double-Edged Sword of Democracy," Transition , Vol. 2, # 26, 27
December 1996, p. 44
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poll conducted in March 1995, only 49 percent of those polled thought that their voting
would give them some say on how the country is run. Sixty-three percent were willing to
give away many of their political freedoms for a strong leader who could solve their
country's problems. 110 So, the Lukashenko regime is not the cause of Belarus's political
orientation. Rather, it is a consequence of the people's mindset.
How is this mindset to be explained? For Vadim Dubnov, it is a question of the
population's demographic and social composition: "War veterans and pensioners (one
fourth of the population) are still alive, while nearly half of the others are post-war immi-
grants from various parts of Russia, and the children of these immigrants and the grand-
children of the veterans." 1 " This somewhat euphemistic way to lay stress on Belarus's age
pyramid, 112 and conservatism becomes all the more evident if one recalls two further
statements. For G. Lych, "This segment [that is, the older people] of the Belorussian
population today is not only numerically significant but also the most politically active,
which cannot be said, for example, about the youth." 113 On the other hand, Alexander
Bely remembers that in the late 1980s, Belarusian intellectuals called their country the
110 USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, "Belarusians Remain Committed to Most
Democratic Principles," USIA Opinion Analysis , M-l 17-95, 1 1 August 1995, p. 6
111 Vadim Dubnov, "The Country That Has Fallen Out of Time," New Times, February 1997, p.
28
112
In fact, the percentage of the Belarusian population being 65 years old or older amounts to
11.1. This does not substantially differ from the figures for the neighboring countries (Latvia
13.2, Lithuania 11.2, Poland 10.7, Russia 10.2, and Ukraine 12.3 percent, respectively). In: The
United Nations' Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), Trends in Europe and North
America 1995 - The Statistical Yearbook of the ECE , New York: United Nations publications,
1995, p. 62
113
G. Lych, "Belarus on the Path to a Market Economy," Problems of Economic Transition,
Vol. 39, # 3, 1 July 1996, p. 34
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"Vendee of perestroika" to express the disdain of the average Belarusian for "such intan-
gible things as democracy or market economy". 114 This reveals two problems. First, the
people's profound conservatism, which obviously is coupled with apathy. 115 Second, the
fact that the older segment of the population is politically more committed and active
than the younger. This second finding is alarming. Not only will a change in the Belaru-
sian mindset be a question of a generational change, but also a question of motivating the
youth to take part in the country's destiny.
Compared with the voting results presented in Table 10, the opposition to the
status quo remains modest, though not negligible. Most visibly, it manifests itself in pub-
lic rallies in the urban centers. Table 1 1 lists the most important demonstrations of the
last couple of years.
Date Issue
February 1994 30,000 people participate in a one day political strike following the
removal of the Supreme Soviet's chairman Stanislau Shushkevich
January 1995 20,000 people rally in Minsk on the call of FTUB to demand higher
wages
24 March 1996 30,000 (40,000?) people rally in Minsk for "independence" and shout
"down with Lukashenko"
Table 1 1/1. Rallies of the Belarusian opposition 116
114
Alexander Bely, Op. cit.
, pp. 4-5
115
Or, as Alexander Bely puts it: "It has proved much easier [to look back] to the Soviet Union,
with its cheap sausage and vodka, guaranteed wages and absence of anything that would demand
mental effort or any kind of responsibility." In: Ibid.
, p. 5
1 The data are from: eg., "Massenprotest in Minsk gegen die Unionsplane mit Russland," Neue
Zurcher ZeitunE , international edition # 71, 25 March 1996, p. 5; Ustina Markus, "Demonstra-
tions Against The President Prompt Harsher Crackdowns," Transition, Vol. 2, # 15, 26 July 1996.
pp. 46-49; eg., "Erneut Proteste gegen Lukaschenko in Minsk," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, interna-
tional edition # 174, 29 July 1996, p. 2; eg, Op. cit. (reference 69), p. 2; gl., "Schwere Zusam-
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Date Issue
26 April 1996 Chernobyl Rally. 50,000 people come out to participate in com-
memorating the disaster's 10th anniversary. The demonstration turns
into protest against the president's policy. Protesters call for Luka-
shenko's resignation
1 May 1996 May Day. 50,000 people take to the street in Minsk against the presi-
dent's policy
15 May 1996 5,000 people rally in the capital to protest the detention of two mem-
bers of Poland's 'Solidarity' union who were arrested for addressing
Belarusian workers
30 May 1996 3,000 people demonstrate to protest the continued detention of par-
ticipants in the Chernobyl Rally
27 July 1996 National Holiday. 7,000 people rally in Minsk against the presidential
regime
15 March 1997 Constitution Day. 1 5,000 people take to the street in Minsk and pro-
test against the plans for a union with Russia
2 April 1997 5,000 people manifest in Minsk against the Treaty on the Union of
Belarus and Russia' signed the same day in Moscow
27 April 1997 Chernobyl Rally. 30,000 people gather in Minsk and protest against
the planed Union with Russia and President Lukashenko's regime
Table 1 1/2. Rallies of the Belarusian opposition
These demonstrations follow a distinct pattern. The gathering people are from ur-
ban centers, belong to the more educated part of the population, take occasion to demon-
strate on special occasions - National Holiday, May Day, or anniversaries of key national
dates - and usually have some ties with BPF. However, even 50,000 people in Minsk's
main square do not build a counterweight to a two-third to three-quarter electoral major-
menstosse in Minsk - Proteste gegen den Unionsvertrag," Neue Zurcher Zeitung. international
edition # 77, 4 April 1997, p. 7; and Reuter, "Gedenken an die Opfer des Tschernobyl-Reaktorun-
gliicks - Versprechungen President Jelzins," Neue Zurcher Zeitung. international edition # 97, 28
April 1997, p. 5
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ity backing the official policy. One of BPF's major - though silent - successes was the
440,000 signatures it collected in 1993 to ask for a referendum on early legislative elec-
tions. This achievement was reduced to its true value when an opinion poll revealed that
only 30 percent of the Belarusians favored a referendum, while 25 percent said they
would not even vote if such a referendum was set up. 117
The state power reacts in an increasingly tough manner against the rallying peo-
ple. It turns the country's security forces against the crowds to manhandle demonstrators.
Large-scale arrests follow most of the rallies. In a more subtle way, early in March 1997,
President Lukashenko announced the creation of a 'Youth Union' to fight "nihilism, in-
fantilism, and the [youth's] indifference to politics."" 8 The union shall become the only
representative of youth interests to the state and be the only youth organization to be
funded at public expense. This and other similar measures - for example, the nationaliza-
tion of all sports grounds and facilities - certainly do not attempt to awaken the politi-
cally indifferent youth. Rather, they tend to monitor and to control youth activities to pre-
vent urban juveniles to take part in the protest rallies.
The congruent attitude of both the Belarusian elites and people will be of para-
mount importance for the future of an independent state. As this attitude will not change
before long, it is likely that Belarus will continue to hand over its domestic destiny to a
"strong man", while - in its longing to go "back to Russia" - it will maintain the attitude
of a petitioner towards its former overseer.
117 US1A Office of Research and Media Reaction, "Belarus at Crossroads," USIA Opinion Re-
search , 18 March 1993, p. 10
118 Quoted in: wdn., "'Komsomol' fur Weissrussland - Einheitsverband der Jugendlichen." Neue
Zurcher Zeitung, international edition #51,3 March 1997, p. 2
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D. THE ECONOMY
There is a timeless Roman proverb that says ubi bene ubi patria. In other words,
people develop ties and patriotic sentiments for their place of residence if the state or-
ganization in which they live makes them feel well. Among others, economic wellbeing
is one of the strongest factors of popular satisfaction or dissatisfaction. All post-Soviet
regimes faced the difficult task not to disappoint their people's high expectations of an
immediately better economic situation. This was especially true for Belarus, which
maintained one of the highest standards of living in the Soviet Union. However, all
Newly Independent States - regardless of whether they pushed for, or went along with,
the transition to a market economy - experienced a tremendous initial economic decline,
and thus the anger of their populations.
In addition, all new regimes had to undo their close economic ties with their for-
mer hegemon and to shift their production to goods competitive on the world market.
This painful transformation has not been completed yet and is likely to continue. Pessi-
mists even foresee that some post-Soviet economies will never catch up with western
standards. They argue that poor states cannot afford to save and, hence, to invest because
their incomes are too low. This generates a vicious circle: These economies are con-
demned to an output of producer goods with a low increase in value, which, in turn, wid-
ens the gap that separates them from performing economies. We will see in Chapter VI
below that this an important factor in assessing the likelihood of a western integration or
a Russian reintegration of these countries. 119
119
Peter Robejsek, "Wo verlauft die ktinftige Ost-West-Grenze? - Die Konturen der kommen-
den Teilung Europas," Europaische Sicherheit, March 1997, p. 42
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This section will focus on (1 ) Belarus's economic viability as given by population,
resources, and infrastructure; (2) The country's economic dependence on Russia; and (3)
The Belarusians' economic prosperity since independence.
1. Economic Potential and Infrastructure
Some basic economic data are summarized in Table 12. Though not being par-
ticularly favorable for natural resources and raw material, they show that the country has
a fair potential to sustain economic independence. Particularly in its industrial produc-
tion, Belarus takes the lead among the CIS countries. This is due to the fact that its in-
dustrial infrastructure has been completely rebuilt after World War II.
Land, climate
• Area 80,155 square miles
• Arable land (generally 29 percent (of which 22 percent were
fertile soils) contaminated by the Cher-
nobyl accident)
• Forests 30 percent
• Climate Temperate continental
Population All data are from 1996
• Total 10,315,000
• Economically active 4,715,000 (46 percent)
population
of which in:




• Unemployment rate 2.4 percent
Table 12/1 . Fundamental Belarusian economic data 120
120 The data are from: Arthur Banks, Alan Day, and Thomas Muller (Eds.), Op. cit. , p. 81; Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, Op. cit. , p. 40; Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS (CIS STAT),
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Natural resources and raw
materials
Wood 232. 1 cubic feet ( 1 990-94 average annual
timber production)
Peat 2 million metric tons (1993 production)
Crude Oil 1 .9 million metric tons ( 1 995 production)
4 1 1 pounds per capita
Natural gas 10 million cubic feet (1995 production)
85 cubic feet per capita
Industrial infrastructure and All data are 1995 production
production







st {per capita output), refrigerators and freezers
1
st (per capita output), tape recorders
1





Industrial infrastructure and All data are from 1995
production (cont.)
• Oil refineries 40 million metric tons per year refining capacity
Belarus ranks ... of all CIS countries for the production of
• Mineral fertilizers 1
st (output per acre arable land)










• Highways 61,375 miles
• Railroads 3,480 miles (16 percent electrified)
• Pipelines 920 miles (crude oil)
1,240 miles (natural gas)
690 miles (refined products)
Table 12/2. Fundamental Belarusian economic data
The CIS Countries in Figures, Moscow (Russian Federation): Interstate Statistical Committee of






















(1995 per capita produc-
tion; Belarus ranks seventh
of all CIS countries)
Table 12/3. Fundamental Belarusian economic data
It has to be noted that much of this industrial production consumes high levels of
energy and raw material (for example, fertilizers or paper), which is a bad fit for the
country's poor energy resources and output. Furthermore, these figures tell us nothing
about the world market competitiveness of Belarusian products. So, for example, the
"Belarus" tractors were a landmark of Soviet agriculture. According to Vadim Dubnov,
they are "still produced in the same numbers as before, [and] get put in storage in the
same numbers i,121
2. Dependence on Russia
In the pre- 1991 era, Belarus ranked fourth among the Soviet republics in terms of
per capita gross domestic product (GDP). The country's economy was closely linked
with the one of the other republics, especially with Russia. In 1990, inter-republican trade
121 Vadim Dubnov, Op. cit. (reference 1 1 1 ), p. 30
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accounted for 80 percent of the imports and for 90 percent of the exports, to include 90
percent of all energy requirements and 70 percent of all raw materials. Table 13 shows
that, though the dependence has been substantially lowered, Belarus's trade is still heavily


















(Value percent of all exports to the
total exports) CIS)
1990 80.0 NA 90.0 NA
1994 68.2 NA 58.9 NA
1995 69.7 91.0 60.0 78.8
1996 65.6 80.2 65.9 78.5
NA Figjure non available
Table 13. Belarusian inter-republic and CIS trade, respectively 122
So, the Belarusian imports from the CIS average some 65 to 70 percent of all the
country's imports, with Russia alone providing 60 percent thereof. Likewise, Belarus's
exports to the CIS amount to some 60 to 65 percent of all its exports, with Russia pur-
chasing an average of 50 percent of the country's foreign sales. In other words Belarus is
122 The data are from: CIS STAT, Op. cit.
. pp. 23, 24, 100, 101, and 146; and CIS STAT, Com-
monwealth of Independent States in 1996 , Moscow (Russian Federation): Interstate Statistical
Committee of the CIS, 1997, pp. 97 and 100
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still dependent on Russia for more than half of its commercial exchanges and is among
the CIS countries most dependent on Russia. 123
Table 14. gives an overview of the three main goods in Belarus's CIS commercial
exchange in the last two years.
Good category
Imports
(Value percent of all imports from the CIS)
1995 1996
Mineral products 52.5 47.4
Products of the chemical industry to in-
clude plastics and rubbers
12.8 12.3
Non-precious metals and articles thereof 12.2 13.7
Exports
(Value percent of all exports to the CIS)
Good category 1995 1996
Transport means 20.0 16.3
Machines 18.1 17.3
Refined mineral products 14.7 14.1
Table 14. Main goods in Belarus's CIS trade 124
Typically, Belarus imports energy, raw materials, and non-manufactured goods,
while it exports its top products, presented in Table 12 above, and mineral products im-
m The three CIS countries most dependent on Russia for imports are Belarus. Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine. In 1995 and 1996, Kazakhstan got 49 and 56 percent of all its imports from Russia. The
figures for Ukraine amounted to 52 and 39 percent, respectively. For the exports, the three coun-
tries most dependent on the Russian market are Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. Here, the 1995
and 1996 figures amounted to 47 and 54 percent for Moldova, and to 43 and 36 percent for
Ukraine. In: CIS STAT, Op. cit. (1997), pp. 48 and 100-01
124 The data are from: Ibid. , pp. 102-03 and 1 10-1
1
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proved in its refineries. 125 Though the breakdown of the goods coming from, or going to,
Russia is not available, the combination of the figures in Tables 13 and 14 does never-
theless indicate Belarus's paramount dependency on energy imports from Russia.
The country suffers not only a physical energy dependence on its mighty neigh-
bor; it also accumulates a huge energy debt toward Russia. The situation gradually wors-
ened as Russia adapted its energy prices to world market levels. In August 1993, Be-
larus's oil and natural gas debt amounted to $ 350 million. By early 1994, it topped off at
$ 1.4 billion. 126 The country tries to trade this debt against alleged Belarusian costs for
hosting Russian troops and for assets frozen in the former Soviet Foreign Trade Bank. In
1996, "Belarus may have been saved from economic collapse by Russia's decision (...) to
write off a 775 million dollar debt for energy supplies and 470 million dollar in intergov-
ernmental debt." " An alarming phenomenon is that the write-off of these debts does not
happen for free. Rather, it helps Russia to enhance its direct influence in Belarus. So, the
Russian energy giant Gazprom holds already a 30 percent share of the Belarusian Novo-
grudsk Gas Apparatus Factory, and is making arrangements for taking over Belarus's
largest nitric fertilizer factory, Aznot in Grodno. Likewise, other Russian companies of
12
It is interesting to note that Belarus's trade patterns with non-CIS countries do substantially
vary from those shown in Table 14. The three main good categories imported from the rest of the
world in 1995 were machines, products of the chemical industry, and textiles. The main Belaru-
sian exports to the non-CIS markets were wood and wood pulp, textiles, and machines. In: CIS
STAT, Op. cit. (1996). pp. 102-03 and 106-07
126
Ustina Markus, "The Russian-Belarusian Monetary Union," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.
3, # 20, 20 May 1994, pp. 30-31
127
In return, Belarus waived a 914 million dollars claim for Russian troops stationed on its ter-
ritory, and a 250 million dollars claim for Belarusian companies' assets. In: Natalia Gurushina,




the energy sector hold substantial stocks of, or are competing for, Belarusian refineries.
Belarus might enter, or has already entered, a vicious circle. It pawns or sells its industrial
basis against Russia's energy supply. This in turn is nothing other than a creeping inte-
gration process in which Belarus will definitely be the losing partner.
3. The Belarusians' Economic Prosperity
The following subsection tries to assess the prosperity of the Belarusians. It does
it by focusing on main macro-economic indicators like GDP, industrial output, and infla-
tion, and on the population's money income. Where available, the Belarusian figures will
be compared to the corresponding data of the country's neighbors. Furthermore, the sec-
tion investigates the state of the Belarusian privatization program.
The rationale for doing so is the following: Adam Przeworski et al. have analyzed
the criteria that create popular satisfaction with a political system. They argue that growth
and moderate inflation are more important than wealth as such. In other words, a citi-
zenry will perceive a system to perform well and to fulfil its needs if the latter manages to
generate economic development regardless - within certain limits - of the absolute level
of affluence.
129 On the other hand, according to classical capitalism, the privatization of
state assets and the creation of a private entrepreneurship are supposed to boost an econ-
omy by roping the people's initiative and responsibility into the system. 130
The Russian Slavneft holds a share of the refinery in Mozyr, while Lukoil and Yukos com-
pete for the refinery in Novopolotsk. In: Vadim Dubnov, Op. cit. (reference 1 1 1), p. 31
129 Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Ferando Limongi, "What
makes democracies endure?" Journal of Democracy , Vol. 7, # 1, January 1996, pp. 40-42
130 We will however admit that this view may be biased. Belarusian elites are not fond of capi-
talistic virtues (see Table 9) and the Belarusian people recently turned down a referendum ques-
tion that foresaw to free the access to land property (see Table 10/2)
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Year
Belarus Latvia Lithuania Poland Russia Ukraine
Annual real GDP growth / decline in percent
1990 -2.0 + 2.9 -6.9 - 11.6 -3.0 -3.6
1991 -1.3 - 10.4 -13.1 -7.0 -5.0 -8.7
1992 -9.6 -34.9 -34.0 + 2.6 -14.5 -9.9
1993 -10.6 -14.9 -30.4 + 3.8 -8.7 - 14.2
1994 -12.6 + 0.6 + 1.0 + 5.2 -12.7 -22.9
1995 -10.0 -1.6 + 3.0 + 7.0 -4.2 - 11.8
1996 + 3.0 + 2.5 + 4.0 + 6.0 -6.0 -10.0
Overall real GDP growth / decline since 1990 in percent
-35.4 -49.7 -56.8 + 18.2 -41.7 -56.8
Table 15. Evolution of the real GDP of Belarus and its neighbors between 1990 and
1996 131
Table 15 shows the real GDP evolution of Belarus and ist neighbors between 1990
and 1996. The table shows that - with the exception of Poland, for which other criteria
apply - the overall Belarusian economy was the least affected by the changes due to the
breakup of the Soviet Union. The data for the gross industrial output presented in Table
16 show a similar pattern. These figures are however distorted by the fact that Belarus has
not yet undertaken resolute steps toward a market economy. In the immediate post-
independence phase, the elites in power feared that a too rapid reorientation of the coun-
131 The data are from: The United Nations' Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), Latest
Trends in Europe and North America, http://www.unece.org/stats/trend/***.htm; 18 March 1997
(***: insert "blr' for Belarus; Tva' for Latvia; 'Itu' for Lithuania; 'pol' for Poland; 'rus' for Russia;
and 'ukr' for Ukraine) (AOL, 21 April 1997)
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try's economy would be detrimental. The 1991 to 1994 Kebich government postponed
reforms.
Year
Belarus Latvia Lithuania Poland Russia Ukraine
Annual gross industrial output growth / decline in percent
1990 + 2.1 + 0.7 -2.6 -24.2 -0.1 -0.1
1991 -1.0 -0.7 -3.5 -11.9 -8.0 -4.8
1992 -9.4 -34.6 -30.0 + 3.9 -18.0 -6.4
1993 -10.0 -32.3 -34.5 + 6.4 -14.1 -8.0
1994 -17.1 -6.8 -28.0 + 11.9 -20.9 -27.3
1995 -11.7 -6.3 + 6.2 + 9.4 -3.3 -12.0
1996 + 3.2 + 0.7 + 2.8 + 9.1 -5.0 -5.1
Overall gross industrial output growth / decline since 1990 in percent
-39.0 -61.1 -65.2 + 38.3 -52.9 -50.2
Table 16. Evolution of the gross industrial output of Belarus and its neighbors between
1990 and 1996 13*
As the economy started to plummet, the impact of the drops in the agricultural and
industrial output - see Table 1 6 for the industrial output - was softened by large subsi-
dies on consumer goods and services. When prices were finally liberalized, they were
compensated for by an 85 percent increase in wages. This in turn fueled a hyperinflation.
Table 1 7 shows the evolution in the consumer price index and in the money income be-
tween 1990 and 1996. The table's drawing is cumulative: At the end of 1996, the cumu-
lated ratio of the index of the people's money income to the consumer price index aver-
132 The data are from: Ibid.
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aged 0.55 in Belarus, 0.53 in Russia, and a mere 0.15 in Ukraine. In other words, today's
money income of the Belarusians and the Russians is only about half of what it was in the
Soviet Union's last full year of existence.
Year
Belarus Russia Ukraine














1991 2.0 1.9 2.6 2.2 3.9 1.9
1992 21.3 16.7 67.8 18.5 81.9 21.5
1993 274.4 222.4 637.6 204.2 8,400 572.0
1994 6,368 3,965 2,011 952 42,091 4905
1995 51,538 25,162 4,652 2,459 118,572 21,566
1996 77,307 42,775 6,978 3,688 213,430 32,349
Table 17. Evolution of the consumer price index and the money income in Belarus and
in its CIS neighbors between 1991 and 1996 133
Table 18 adds some details to the picture in that it contrasts the evolution of dif-
ferent money income indices to the one of the consumer price for the last two years. The
table shows some interesting things. First, the situation in Russia seems to be the best
balanced between the various strata of the population. Second, all three countries experi-
enced improvement in the two last years as compared to the overall ration presented in
Table 17. Third, there is a noticeable discrepancy between the economic situation of re-
133 The data are from: CIS STAT, Op. cit. (19%), pp. 37 and 47 and CIS STAT, Op. cit. (1997),
p. 145
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tirees and students in Belarus. While the former experienced a net income over the last
two years, the latter were clearly discriminated against. One can only guess whether the
pecuniary preference given to the Belarusian retirees is connected with their political ac-
tivity and opinion discussed in section C.2. above.












Belarus 0.79 0.94 1.35 0.45
Russia 0.87 0.73 0.73 1.0
Ukraine 0.92 1.19 NA 0.52
1996
Belarus 1.13 1.07 1.0 0.8
Russia 1.0 1.07 1.0 0.93
Ukraine 0.83 1.06 NA NA
Table 18. Ratio of various money income indices to the consumer price index in Belarus
and in its CIS neighbors in 1995 and 1996 134
Looking at all the data, the nostalgia of the Belarusians for going "back to Russia"
is incomprehensible. The average Russian is not better off than the average Belarusian.
Rather, the economically motivated urge for close ties with Russia can be attributed to
the wish of Belarus's leadership to link the country's economy to the mighty one of its
neighbor in order to avoid painful re-conversion programs.
134 The data are from: Ibid. , (1996), pp. 54 and 55; and (1997), p. 145
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Belarus passed a law On Destatization and Privatization of Government Property
in January 1993. The bill created the conditions for the development of a "socially-
oriented" economy with mixed forms of ownership. Several further laws on privatization
of land, housing, and state property have been adopted since then. The implementation of
the privatization program - which should be completed by the year 2000 - is largely be-
hind schedule. President Lukashenko temporarily stopped privatization in March 1995,
only to resume it in January 1996.
135
Table 19 shows the slow progress in the privatiza-
tion program and the low percentage of independent entrepreneurs and employees of pri-
vate enterprises.
Year
Total percentage of all state assets
slated for privatization that have








1993 <2 180,000 3.0
1994 <10 NA NA
1995 B NA NA
1996 14 260,000 4.4
NA Figure not available
Table 19. The pace of the Belarusian privatization program 136
It has been stated in Table 8 above that Belarus generates less than ten percent of
its GDP from the private sector and that it ranks last of all Newly Independent States and
135
U.S. Department of Commerce, The Republic of Belarus: Economic Overview , http://www.
itaiep.doc.gov/bisnis/country/belecon.html; 20 May 1996 (AOL, 21 January 1997)
136 The data are from: G. Lych, Op. cit. , pp. 32-33 and 37-38
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Central European former Soviet satellites. The negative November 1996 popular vote on
private land property will certainly not back the privatization dossier. It merely adds a
contradiction to the topic: It is difficult to conceive that a state that does not privatize its
primary sector and is very slow in privatizing the secondary and tertiary sectors can de-
velop an effective market economy. This in turn slows down the economic recovery of
the country, hinders this economy's integration into international markets, and consoli-
dates its concentration on the CIS and Russia.
E. SYNTHESIS
This whole chapter has been aimed at determining the status of various Belarusian
factors with regard to their effect on national identity. The record turns out rather badly.
Belarusian national identity is poorly developed and, for the time being, unable to serve
as formative factor for nation-building. None of the examined factors is reassuring.
Ethno-culturally and historically, Belarus's differences with Russia are minimal. Like-
wise, Belarusian institutions and politics do little to develop nationhood. It has been ar-
gued that the Lukashenko regifne is not the cause of Belarus's wish for a close association
with Russia but a consequence of the overall attitude of the Belarusian people. The
popular attitude toward the issue is certainly the most important element in assessing the
likely future of Belarusian sovereignty. Despite an active but numerically weak and po-
litically muzzled nationalist opposition, the overwhelming majority of the Belarusians
sees the country's future in the framework of Russia-oriented arrangements. After all, this
is an understandable and legitimate posture. If Belarus became a nation "by default" in
the turmoil of the Soviet implosion, it is easy to understand that it might aim at associat-
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ing again with Russia once the situation eases off. Economically, Belarus is highly de-
pendent on Russia. The country's economic policy does not do much to lower this de-
pendence.
With regard to the theoretical aspects on alignment policy presented in Chapter II
above, the Belarusian posture is best described as a wish for alignment based on an
asymmetrical dependence and on affinities. Whereas the dependence element is easily
explainable and fits the theory, the nature of the affinities is more difficult to understand.
First, to be sure, there is an element of ideological solidarity.
137
This solidarity, however,
is for an ideology that has failed. It is thus more a longing for something that does no
longer exist, than the expression of a rational will to align with a like state. Then, second,
there is an element of cultural and historical affinity. Yet, this historical affinity is merely
the awareness of having been part of Russia for two hundred years. Hence, the Belarusian
posture is less the expression of a true affinity with Russia, than the behavior of an ado-
lescent that has been forced to leave its parents' home, is unable of managing its inde-
pendence, and wishes to be taken back under the wings of an adult. Belarus has never left
Russia's orbit. Thus, it is likely that the country will continue to behave as a petitioner
toward its former overseer. So, the final decision on Belarus's independence will be taken
in Moscow, not in Minsk.
137 See footnote 24
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IV. THE PROJECT OF A UNION BETWEEN BELARUS AND RUSSIA
Belarus's most important and most complex foreign relationship is the one with
Russia, its former hegemon. This chapter deals with the central question of the thesis: Is
it likely that Belarus will enter some kind of political association with Russia and if so,
what will the nature of such an association be? In doing so, the chapter presents and dis-
cusses the main bilateral treaties signed by the two countries and the posture of the lead-
ers in power. Section D of Chapter III above has presented the Belarusian popular atti-
tude. Chapter V below will investigate the stance of the various Russian political and
public factions.
The first two years of Belarusian sovereignty were characterized by a two-track
policy. On the one hand, the country aspired to full independence; that is, to a diversifi-
cation of Belarusian political and economic links with the rest of the world. The main ad-
vocate of this tendency was Stanislau Shushkevich, the reformist chairman of the Su-
preme Council, who acted as head of state. On the other hand, the conservatives, led by
Prime Minister Vyacheslau Kebich, favored economic state control and close ties with
Russia. In January 1994, Shushkevich was accused of corruption and ousted. The new
head of state, Mechislau Grib, shared Kebich's view in favor of close cooperation with
Moscow. 138
Since then and especially since the 1994 presidential elections, Belarus has aimed
at preserving special ties with Russia and at recreating some type of union. To this end, it
138




has signed a number of bilateral agreements. For example, the two countries entered a
Custom Union in June 1995.
The basic problem with the integration plans between Russia and Belarus is that
the two countries follow different objectives, that the level of integration and the legal
framework within which this integration should occur remain unclear, and that the con-
tracting parties cannot agree on a common agenda.
Economically, Belarus looks to Russia for a bailout, while Russia is not ready and
able to provide it. Valeria Novodvorskaya puts it in a euphemistic way in comparing the
two countries to West and East Germany and by concluding: "Even if the Belarusians are
the Oss is, we are not the Wessis. We cannot afford such an integration." 139
Politically, Minsk aims at an equal status between the two states, while Moscow
assumes it will have the dominant role. No Russian politician has ever clearly explained
what concrete benefits Russia would gain from integration with its western neighbor.
Russia's primary interests in Belarus are the ability to maintain an avenue for exports, es-
pecially for the land-bounded energy transport to the West, and the right to keep troops
stationed at the country's early warning bases. This, however, can be achieved without
any kind of economic or political union. Hence, it cannot be dismissed that Moscow's
motives have much to do with Russian power politics, the nostalgia for Slavic unity, and
with a calming of the Communists and nationalists in the Russian parliament.
So far, many of the Belarusian-Russian bilateral treaties have had more to do with
political and electoral games than with real cooperation or integration. The Agreement on
Valeria Novodvorskaya, "Our Wedding Clothes Are Not Yet Ready," New Times, February
1997, p. 32
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a Monetary Union signed on 12 April 1994 shall exemplify this policy of opportunism.
Table 20 summarizes the agreement's main clauses.
Main clauses
• Right for Russia to determine the common monetary and fiscal policy
• Sole right for the Russian Central Bank to issue currency
• Fixed exchange rate of 1 i between the Russian and the Belarusian ruble
• Lift of the trade and the customs barriers between the two countries
• Cancellation of the 1 .4 billion dollars Belarusian energy debt for the forfeit of alleged
1 .9 billion dollars Belarusian costs for hosting Russian troops
• Free of charge stationing of Russian troops in Belarus up to the year 2020
Table 20. Main clauses of the April 1994 Agreement on a Monetary Union between
Belarus and Russia 140
The treaty can be seen as having been a Russian gesture in support of Belarus's
Prime Minister Kebich, who was running in the July presidential elections. Given the
completely different economic and fiscal policies of the two countries, it was obvious that
a monetary union was unlikely to be realized. In 1994, Russia had managed to throttle
inflation, free prices on most consumer goods, and make headway in privatizing state
enterprises. Meanwhile, the Belarusian ruble - popularly known as the zaichyk, or rabbit
- introduced in 1992, had rapidly lost value. In March 1994, it was worth about 0. 15 Rus-
sian rubles. 141 The Belarusian policy of printing money and of issuing credits to pay
wages and subsidize the agricultural and industrial sectors provoked hyperinflation. 14
Consumer goods continued to be subsidized and privatization had just begun. After Ke-
140 The data are from: Ustina Markus, Op.cit. (reference 126), pp. 28-32
141
Anatolii Rozanov, Op. cit , p. 203
142
See Table 1 7 in Chapter III
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bich lost the presidential election, Russia's Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in-
formed Belarus that Moscow would not implement the monetary union.
A. THE TREATY ON THE FORMATION OF THE COMMUNITY OF BE-
LARUS AND RUSSIA OF 2 APRIL 1996
The two most important agreements the two countries have subscribed to so far
are the Treaty on the Formation of the Community of Belarus and Russia and the Treaty
on the Union of Belarus and Russia, signed on 2 April 1996 and 2 April 1997, respec-
tively. The signing of both agreements was surrounded by much fanfare. The Russian
Orthodox Patriarch Aleksei II gave his blessing to the two ventures in elaborated cere-
monies. 143 The two treaties and the 'Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia' that is an
integral part of the second treaty are reproduced in extenso in the Appendices A to C.
Table 21 reproduces the 1996 agreement's main provisions.
Main clauses
Article 1
Call for the creation of a "politically and economically integrated Community of Belarus
and Russia"
Article 2
Definition of the equality of the two Parties
Table 21/1 . Main clauses of the 2 April 1996 Treaty on the Formation of the Commu-
nity of Belarus and Russia 144
143
Ustina Markus, "Imperial Understretch: Belarus's Union with Russia," Current History, Vol.
95, # 603, October 1996, p. 336; and gl., "Der russisch-weissrussische Unionsvertrag unterzeich-
net - Feierliche Zeremonie im Kreml - Zuruckgestufte Plane Lukaschenkos," Neue Zurcher Zei-
tung, international edition # 76, 3 April 1 997, p. 1
144 The data are from. N.N., Treaty on the Formation of the Community of Belarus and Russia,
N.P.: N.N. (Xeroxed document), provided by the Embassy of the Republic of Belarus to the




Commitment to an agreed foreign policy and a coordinated security policy
Article 4
Commitment to the formation of a single economic area (common market; free move-
ment of goods, services, capital, and labor)
Article 5
Implementation of measures to form a common transportation system, a unified energy
system, and a common scientific, technological and information area by the end of 1 996
Article 7
Call for the unification of the Parties' monetary, credit and budget systems before the end
of 1 997 with the long-term goal of creating a monetary union
Article 9
• Creation of a Supreme Council as the Community's supreme body, including the Par-
ties' heads of state and government, chairmen of the parliaments, as well as the
chairman of the Community's Executive Committee (see Article 11)
• Agreement on the procedure of unanimity for the 'Supreme Council's' decisionmaking
• Agreement on a rotating chairmanship on a two-year term basis
Article 10
• Creation of a Parliamentary Assembly formed from an equal number of parliamen-
tarians of the Parties




Creation ofan Executive Committee as the Community's standing executive body,
formed from an equal number of representatives of the Parties
Article 15
Maintenance of mutual individual state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and distinct Con-
stitutions
Article 16
Maintenance of mutual independent foreign relations
Article 18
Opening of the Community to other states
Table 21/2. Main clauses of the 2 April 1996 Treaty on the Formation of the Commu-
nity of Belarus and Russia
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The wording of the treaty elicits for the following comments. First, it was an im-
pressive and ambitious declaration of intent. The Community committed itself (a) to a
common foreign and security policy, (b) to the creation of a single economic area, and (c)
to the creation of a monetary union. Second, legally, the Community did not aim at a fed-
eral or confederal structure. Rather, the treaty stressed the maintenance of a mutual indi-
vidual state sovereignty. Third, in its succinctness, the treaty was not free of potential
contradictions. Article 3, for example, reads that both sides would coordinate their for-
eign policy, while Article 16 says that they would establish their foreign relations and
sign international treaties independently. Fourth, the treaty did not provide the Commu-
nity's bodies with binding powers and foresaw procedures that were likely to create
deadlocks. Article 9 says that the decisions of the Supreme Council are to be made on the
basis of unanimity, with each Party having one vote. The two partners have conflicting
interests on so many issues that unanimity would hardly be achieved for important mat-
ters. In addition, since the chairmanship of the Council was to be rotated every two years,
it is difficult to imagine that Russia would have allowed the chairman to have any bind-
ing power. Fifth, the specified time frame for the integration was entirely vague. The
treaty only scheduled preparatory measures but not the timetable of the integration itself.
Due to the document's wide scope and relative ambiguity, most of the concrete
intentions of the two Parties remained unclear. Hence, the ratification process of the two
countries' Legislatures, further statements of the respective leaders, and the concrete ac-
tivities over time of the Community's Executive Committee had to be closely monitored.
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Though having been rapidly and overwhelmingly ratified by both parliaments, the
agreement met swift criticism and mockery. 145 Several commentators spoke of a bluff.
They viewed the treaty as nothing else than an electoral move of President Boris Yeltsin
to outflank his closest rival's popular proposal to recreate the Soviet Union. 146 Others ar-
gued that it was President Lukashenko who sought to exploit Yeltsin's vulnerability to
press for progress on integration. 147
The Community's bodies met several times throughout 1996. Between April and
September, the Supreme Council, headed by President Lukashenko, adopted eight reso-
lutions, while the Executive Committee - under the chairmanship of Russian Prime Min-
ister Chernomyrdin - took up on three resolutions. 148 With regard to the treaty's scheduled
145 The Russian Duma voted a 320 to 8 resolution in favor of the treaty on 5 April 1996. In May,
the Belarusian Supreme Council ratified the document by a 166 to 3 vote, with 1 abstention. Still
in May, both Houses of the Russian Federal Assembly ratified the agreement. In: Ustina Markus,
Op. cit. (reference 143), p. 338
See e.g. Dmitry Agnin, "Union of Russian and Belarusian Republics," New Times, April
1996, p. 9; or wdn., "Politische Polarisierung unter den Weissrussen - Der Gemeinschaftsvertrag
mit Russland stosst auf Widerstand," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, international edition # 80, 4 April
1996, p. 1
Ustina Markus, "Belarus, Ukraine Take Opposite Views," Transition, Vol. 2, #23, 15 No-
vember 1996, p. 20
The resolutions adopted by the Supreme Council were the followings: On 2 April 1996, #1
'On priority measures to put the Treaty on the Formation of the Community of Belarus and Rus-
sia' into operation', #2 'On celebrating the day of Unity between Russia and Belarus on the 2 nd of
April'. On 22 June 1996, #3 'On citizens' equal rights to employment, remuneration of labor and
granting of other social and labor guarantees', #4 'On free exchange of housing', #5 'On joint ac-
tion to minimize and overcome the after-effects of the Chernobyl accident', #6 'On the Customs
Committee of the Community', #7 'On issues raised by the organs of the Belarusian-Russian
Community', and #8 'On financing the overhaul and restoration works on the Brest-Hero Fortress
memorial complex. For its part, the Executive Committee adopted the following resolutions. On
1 1 April 1996, #1 'On citizens' equal rights to have education'. On 15 May 1996, #2 'On recipro-
cal granting of equal rights to Belarusian and Russian citizens to receive comprehensive medical
care'. On 4 September 1996, #3 'On securing Belarusian and Russian citizens equal rights and
conditions for bringing in or taking out hard currency when crossing the common customs bor-
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objectives for 1996, all the passed resolutions can be viewed as being of minor impor-
tance.
The real stance of the two countries' leaders remained unclear. On 1 3 November
1996, President Lukashenko addressed a speech to the Russian State Duma. He stood up
for a rapid realization of the Community and proposed a common session of the two na-
tions' parliaments to deliberate on the procedure and extent of the integration - though
this is not the procedure foreseen in Article 10 of the treaty. Furthermore, he suggested
the discussion of "the formation of a new, unified state" 149 - despite the wording of the
treaty's Article 15.
On 14 January 1997, President Yeltsin sent a message to his Belarusian counter-
part in which he proposed "a referendum in the two countries on their possible unifica-
tion"
150
and sketched a likely procedure for the merger. Belarusian voblastsi and harady
(that is, the country's regional and administrative subdivisions) should join the Russian
Federation individually. 151 The maneuver was obvious. By eliminating the republic level,
President Lukashenko would have been reduced to a kind of 'general governor' of the
Belarusian territory. The latter's reaction was not long in coming. In a closed session of
der.' See: Belarusian Presidential Administration, Belarus - Russia: Along the Road to Unity ,
http://www.belarus.net/president/unity 1.htm; no date (AOL, 18 January 1997)
149 Quoted in: gl., "Lukaschenko wirbt fur die Union mit Russland - Umstrittener Auftritt vor
der Staatsduma in Moskau," Neue Zurcher Zeitung . international edition # 266, 14 November
1996, p. 3. See also: Tom Warner, "Excerpts From Speeches, Editorials, and Other Notable
Documents: Defending the 'Sacred-Cause' of Russo-Belarusian Integration," Transition, Vol. 2, #
25, 13 December 1996, p. 61
150 Quoted in: N.N., "Yeltsin Offers Union With Belarus: Is He Serious?," The Current Digest of
the Post-Soviet Press. Vol. 49, # 2, 12 February 1997, p. 7
151
gl., "Neubelebung ostslawischer Unionsplane," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, international edition #
11, 15 January 1997. p. 3
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the Belarusian parliament on 20 February 1997, Lukashenko denounced a "deplorable
state of affairs with Russia" 152 and announced new proposals on the creation of a union
for the beginning of March. On 28 February 1997, the imbroglio was total when Belaru-
sian Foreign Minister Ivan Antonovich announced in Kiev that a "merging of the two
states' sovereignty [was] out of the question" and that President Lukashenko's statement
on "One Land - One Vote [had to be understood as] a search for a union of two sovereign
states."
153
These contradicting statements smack of a "cat and mouse play" and are unworthy
of a serious foreign policy. Throughout 1996 and early 1997, each Party to the April 1996
treaty vied with the other in coming up with new structural proposals on a merger of the
two states, while nothing substantial was done to initiate the implementation of the
agreements' provisions.
B. THE TREATY ON THE UNION OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA OF 2
APRIL 1997
On 2 April 1997, Belarus and Russia signed a new agreement that consists of two
documents. The first, named Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia, summarizes the
more elaborated second paper called Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia. The ar-
rangement expressly confirms the validity of the April 1996 treaty. The main provisions
of the new treaty are reproduced in Table 22. Appendices B and C contain the full text.
152 Quoted in: wdn., "Scheinbare Distanz Lukaschenkos zu Moskau," Neue Zurcher Zeitung,
international edition # 44, 22/23 February 1997, p. 5
153 Quoted in: wdn., "Minsk verbreitet Zweifel iiber Anschluss an Moskau - Weissrusslands
Aussenminister in Kiew," Neue Zurcher Zeitung , international edition # 50, 1/2 March 1997, p. 4
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To come to the point, the newest declaration of intent does not add fundamentally new
elements to what has been decided a year ago.
Main clauses of the Treaty
Article 1
• Redefinition of the association's naming: "The Community shall be transformed into a
Union"
• Confirmation that the two states will retain full sovereignty
Article 6
Confirmation of the provisions of the April 1996 treaty in so far as they are not in contra-
diction with the Union treaty or its Charter
Main clauses of the Charter
Articles 2 and 17
• Creation of a Union citizenship
• Grant of free movement, residence, private property, right to vote and eligibility on
the local level for Union citizens in the entire territory of the Union
Articles 3 and 37
• Commitment of the Union Parties to sovereign equality, democracy, and respect for
human rights
• Commitment of the Union's development to "a consistent advance towards the vol-
untary unification of the two states" on the basis of the two countries' popular will
Articles 4, 20, and 22
• Statement that the Union shall be a subject of international law
• Devolution of the right "to conduct international negotiations" and "to conclude inter-
national treaties on behalf of the Union" to the chairman of the Union's 'Supreme
Council'
• Devolution of the right "to approve international treaties concluded on behalf of the
Union" to the Union's Parliamentary Assembly
Table 22/1 . Main clauses of the 2 April 1997 Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Rus-
sia and its Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia 154
154
N.N., Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia, and Charter of the Union of Belarus and
Russia. N.P.: N.N. (Xeroxed documents), provided by the Embassy of the Republic of Belarus to
the United States, 18 April 1997
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Main clauses of the Charter
Article 7
Opening of the Union to other states
Articles 8 and 1
5
Political tasks of the Union. Among those:
• Agreement to work out "common positions on international matters" and to coordi-
nate the Parties' foreign policy
• Commitment to "international peace" and "the limitation and reduction of armaments
and military spending by way of liquidating nuclear and other weapons of mass de-
struction"
Article 9
Economic tasks of the Union. Among those:
• Commitment of the Parties to "a socially oriented market"
• Intention to create a single economic area
• Intention to create "the necessary conditions" for a monetary union
Article 10
Social tasks of the Union. Among those:
• Commitment of the Parties to an extensive "social protection"
Articles 11, 15, and 19
Tasks of the Union in the sphere of security . Among those:
• Adoption "in case of necessity" of "joint measures to avert a threat to the sovereignty
and independence of the Parties"
• Commitment to a "collective security" (Article 15) or a "collective defense" (Article
19)
• Intention to work out "a joint defense order"
Articles 19 and 20
Definition of the prerogatives and the functioning of the Union's Supreme Council
Articles 12, 14, and 15
Legal tasks of the Union. Among those:
• Intention to unify the legislation of the Parties and to create a legal framework of the"
Union
Table 22/2. Main clauses of the 2 April 1997 Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Rus-
sia and its Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia
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Main clauses of the Charter
Articles 21 to 25
Definition of the prerogatives and the functioning of the Union's Parliamentary Assem-
bly. Among those:
• Right to adopt acts with the status of "recommendations" to the Parties' parliaments
and to the Union's Supreme Council
• Right to submit "proposals" on the development of the Union's legal framework
• Right to "consider" the Union's budget
• Right to approve international treaties concluded on behalf of the Union
Articles 26 to 29, and 30
• Definition ofthe functioning of the Union's Executive Committee
• Statement that the Committee's prerogatives will be determined by a yet pending stat-
ute
• Right of the Committee "to adopt self-implementing decisions (...) binding for all the
bodies of the Union" (such decisions may however be suspended or cancelled by the
Union's Supreme Council)
• Right to develop the Union's budget
Table 22/3. Main clauses of the 2 April 1997 Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Rus-
sia and its Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia
In fact, the lengthy text of the Charter merely adds some new ambiguities and
contradictions to the 1996 Community treaty and to the real goals of the two contracting
Parties. While, for example, the 1996 treaty clearly committed the Parties to an "agreed
foreign policy", the Charter speaks of "common positions on international matters" and of
a "coordination of foreign policy". At least linguistically, this is a watering down of the
1996 position. The foreseen "coordinated security policy" of 1996 does not either become
clearer in the new document. So, Article 15 speaks of "collective security", while Article
19 uses the term "collective defense", whereas Article 1 1 tasks the Union to adopt "ade-
quate joint measures" in the security field "in case of necessity".
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The future legal status of the Union remains a mystery, too. While Article 1 of the
Treaty on the Union clearly reaffirms that the two Parties will retain full sovereignty, the
Union shall nevertheless become "a subject of international law" 155
,
conduct international
negotiations, and conclude international treaties. A complete merger of the two states has
been postponed sine die: The Union's "development shall be directed at a consistent ad-
vance towards the voluntary unification of the two states on the basis of the free expres-
sion of the will of their peoples." 156
Finally, a single currency and a monetary union between the two countries also
have been delayed. The Union is merely tasked to "create the necessary conditions for the
introduction of a single currency." 157 President Yeltsin made it quite clear: "There must
be no illusions here" 158 he said; a common currency would be a "rather lengthy proc-
ess."
159
Besides, it seems that neither the treaty nor the charter takes the domestic Belaru-
sian situation into consideration. The fact that Belarus commits itself to "the development
of democracy, universal respect for, and implementation of, human rights and basic free-
doms" 160 and agrees that Union citizens will have access to private property on its terri-
tory contains a bitter irony.
155
Ibid. (Charter), Article 4
156
Ibid. (Charter), Article 3
157
Ibid. (Charter), Article 9
158 Quoted in: Lee Hockstader, "Belarus, Russia Move Toward a New Union," The Washington
Post . 3 April 1997, p. A23




(reference 154), (Charter), Article 8
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The new Belarusian-Russian agreement remains completely silent with reference
to the implementation schedule of the measures agreed upon. The text neither prioritizes
the Union's various tasks, 161 nor sets up any kind of timetable. While the 1996 Commu-
nity treaty scheduled at least some of the preparatory measures, the newest agreement
mentions but one exact date. It is also symptomatic that the statute of the Executive
Committee - as the body of the Union responsible for the implementation of the treaty's
provisions - is still pending. We have seen that the Committee has been rather inefficient
throughout 1996. It is likely that this will remain so in future.
Much of the treaty and of the charter reads like a hastily written down laundry list
of possible integration steps. Allegedly, the drafting of the documents did not happen
without much mishap. So, due to the efforts of the reformers in the Russian government,
a first version - of which elements had already been handed over to the media - was
turned down in extremis. The final draft was obviously set up during the night preceding
the signature ceremony and compromised between President Lukashenko's desire for an
extensive treaty and Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais' urge for con-
ciseness - and, possibly, vagueness. 162 The fact is that Dmitry Rjurikov, President Yelt-
sin's chief adviser for foreign policy and the main Russian responsible for the setup of the
treaty was removed from office on 6 April. 163 Unnamed insiders in the Kremlin reported
161 So for instance, the implementation of "joint measures" in the security field (Charter, Article
1 1 ) seem to have the same importance as say the creation of a common "database on job vacan-
cies" (Charter, Article 10) or the pursuance of a common "hydro-meteorology policy" (Charter,
Article 15/k)
162
gi, "Mysterioser Unionsvertrag Moskaus mit Minsk - Engere Bindungen, aber kein gemein-
samer Staat," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, international edition # 75, 2 April 1997, p. 2
163
#/., "Weiterer Aufstieg Jastschembskis im Kreml - Nachwehen zur Panne mit dem Unions-
vertrag mit Minsk," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, international edition # 79, 7 April 1997, p. 3
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that President Yeltsin was extremely displeased with the way the treaty had been pre-
pared. 164
Though the ratification of the new treaty is certain, it is difficult if not impossible
to assess the future line of action of the two protagonists on the basis of the newest bilat-
eral agreement. President Yeltsin dampened the unification prospective at the Kremlin
signing ceremony by saying: "We are transforming the Community between Russia and
Belarus not into a single country but into a union between two independent countries." 165
President Lukashenko took quite the opposite view by stating: "Sooner or later the two
countries will arrive at a single house where fraternal peoples will live." 166 Hence, further
sterile daydreams and controversies about the unification of the two countries are likely:
The Russian Duma was not long to announce it would initiate a parliamentary debate on
a Belarusian-Russian merger. 167 As for 1996, the two countries' leaders can be expected
to misuse the Union project for short-winded political demonstrations. Much will rest in
the future statute of the Union's "Executive Committee', in this body's ability to prioritize
on some tasks, and on its endeavor to implement them.
164
Ibid.
165 Quoted in: Lee Hockstader, Op. cit. , p A23. This statement stands in sharp contrast to Yelt-
sin's referendum proposal of January 1997. It reveals either the president's fickleness or its
changing dependence on the various factions of its entourage
166 Quoted in: Ibid.
167
gl., Op. cit. (reference 143), p. 1
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Finally, it is interesting to note that treaty and charter have been submitted to a
nation-wide discussion until 15 May 1997 and that the ratification process in the two
countries' parliaments will not start before the end of this consultation. 168
The International Discussion Club, Moscow, Belarus - Russia Union Treaty Discussion,
http://www.cis.lead.org/zarov/bel-rus-union.doc.html; 22 April 1997 (AOL, 24 April 1997)
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V. THE STANCE OF DIFFERENT RUSSIAN FACTIONS
In order to be balanced, the thesis has also to present the point of view of some of
the influential Russian factions. Russia being definitely the more influential partner, the
final decision to form, and the nature of, an association with Belarus will depend on the
Russians' stance. In other words and with regards to the conclusions drawn in Chapter III,
Belarus will remain independent as long as Russia sees a sovereign Belarus to be profit-
able to its own interests.
The Russian Federation has not yet taken its final shape as a state. Correspond-
ingly, a consensus among the Russian elites on the country's national interests - to in-
clude its relations with the other former Soviet republics - has not yet emerged. Hence,
the views on the desirable nature and intensity of Belarusian-Russian relations also vary.
Obviously, the plan for a union with Belarus matches the views of the Kremlin
conservatives and of the Russian nationalists and Communists in parliament. We have
seen in the previous chapters that the State Duma overwhelmingly ratified the 1996
Community treaty and foresees the initiation of a parliamentary debate on a Belarusian-
Russian merger. At a closer look however, the opinions of the Russian parliamentarians
differ somewhat. While Gennady Zyuganov, head of the Communist Party of the Russian
Federation (KPRF), sees Russia to be "viable" 169 only if it consists of "the mighty na-
tional core of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians" 170
,
he presently manipulates the
169
Excerpt of Zyuganov's 1995 Ph.D. dissertation Tendencies and Mechanisms of the Social-
political Change in Contemporary Russia', quoted in: Felix Ingold, "Russland in der Krise - Sol-
schenizyn und Sjuganow melden sich zu Wort," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, international edition # 95,




idea on deepening integration with Belarus for reasons of his political differences with
Yeltsin. So, he criticized the Russian president's January 1997 referendum proposal,
calling it "a political intrigue"
171
and doubting that "the organizers of the USSR's breakup
would be able to bring about reunification." . While Yegor Stroyev, chairman of the
Federation Council, believes that "both states would gain from the unification of Russia
and Belarus," 173 , his counterpart from the Russian lower chamber, Gennady Seleznyov,
speaks with more restraint. For Seleznyov, "the proposal for the unification of the Rus-
sian Federation and Belarus is only a possible topic of discussion." 174 Yet, even the cen-
ter-right party 'Russia Is Our Home' (NDR) favors the idea of a close association between
the two countries. Sergei Belyayev, leader of NDR, expresses the opinion that "the idea
of a community is in keeping with the idea of a Confederation." 175 Finally, a non-
parliamentary official, Russia's Constitutional Court's chairman Vladimir Turmanov, has
a stance similar to that of Belyayev. He calls "a Confederation (...) a possible option for
unification".
176
However, he does not rule out "the possibility of Belarus becoming a part
ofRussia."
177
171 Quoted in: N.N., Op. cit. (reference 150), p. 8
172
IbKL
173 Quoted in: Ibid.
174 Quoted in: Ibid.
175 Quoted in: Ibid.




Of greater importance than declarations of officials submitted to the dynamic of
day-to-day politics, is the widespread nostalgia for Slavic unity and conviction that some
of the former Soviet republics are geopolitically and historically crucial to Russia. In a
panel discussion conducted with some 70 "elite and educated Russians" 178 in Moscow,
Krasnodar, Kazan, and Khabarovsk in September 1996, most panelists expressed the
opinion that "the three [countries (that is, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus)] would get to-
gether somehow, sooner or later." 179 More specifically, the prestigious Russian 'Council
on Foreign and Defense Policy' published its opinion on the stance that Russia should
take toward the other former Soviet republics in May 1996. In a document provocatively
named 'Will the Union Be Reborn?', the Council answers the question in a negative way,
but unmistakably stresses that one of Russia's "vitally important interests" includes
"establishing the closest possible political, economic, and military-political union with
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan." 1 1 The Council sees a Confederation to be the
"reasonably realistic"
182 form for such a union. It thinks that "confederative relations with
Belarus [could be established] within one to two years, despite existing economic and
legal problems."
183
Finally, it is important to recall that the notion of an organic, histori-
178 USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, "Russian elites discuss Russia's place in the
world," USIA Opinion Analysis, R-9-96, December 1996, p. 15
179
Ibid., pp. 15-17
180 Quoted in: Scott Parrish, "Will the Union Be Reborn?" Transition . Vol. 2, # 15, 26 July 1996,
p. 33. It is interesting to note the Council's definition of 'vitally important': "Vitally important








cally-rooted Slavic fraternity is also the stance of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn who is influen-
tial among certain Russian intellectual circles. In his book Rebuilding Russia written in
1990, Solzhenitsyn argued that the separateness of the Ukrainian and the Belarusian peo-
ples is an "invented falsehood"
184
and he warned "to lop off [the two republics] from a
1 RS
living organism." Since then, Solzhenitsyn has not stopped advocating a pan-Slavic
and Orthodox greater Russia. 186
Opponents of a special Russian relationship with Belarus are the reformers and
the liberal democrats. In January 1994, when Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar and
Finance Minister Boris Fedorov resigned, both cited their opposition to the treaty on an
'Agreement on a Monetary Union' with Belarus as one of the principal reasons for resig-
nation.
187
More recently, 70 democratic deputies left the State Duma in protest when Presi-
dent Lukashenko adressed the chamber on 13 November 1996 Their motives however
were not clear-cut. Grigori Yavlinsky
,
co-leader of the centrist Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin
or Yabloco Bloc, said that the opposition against Lukashenko was "less [an expression
against the latter's] Slavophile old-Communist daydreams (...) [than against the fact] that
human rights in Belarus were trampled." 188 After the signature of the 2 April 1997 treaty,
184 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Rebuilding Russia - Reflections and Tentative Proposals, New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1991, p. 14
185
Ibid, p. 17
1 See e.g. Felix Ingold, Op. cit.. p. 33
187
Ustina Markus, Op. cit. (reference 126), p. 30
188 Quoted in: gi. Op. cit. (reference 149), p. 3
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Yavlinsky stressed that "the agreement was a mistake" 189 and noted that between Belarus
and Russia "the difference in the progress of reforms and in the state of the economy was
too great"
190
. He repeated that "human rights and freedom of information were not ob-
served in Belarus."
191
It shall be noted that the Yabloko Bloc not only criticizes the Be-
larusian-Russian project. The party published an alternative proposition to the Treaty on a
Union of Belarus and Russia in the Obschaya Gazeta of 10-16 April 1997. It advocates
limiting the scope of a union to an "Economic Alliance" and to push - in a first step - for
a rapprochement limited to the free movement of goods, services, labor, and capital. 192
We have seen in the previous chapter that the drafting of the 'Treaty on the Union
of Belarus and Russia' did not happen without contretemps. Obviously, Kremlin reform-
ers and conservatives disagreed on the treaty's wording. The reformers - under the fresh
impetus of the recently appointed First Deputy Prime Minister Chubais - focus on re-
structuring and modernizing Russia's economy and refuse to be saddled with the burden
of Belarus's economy. According to Lee Hockstader, the Kremlin conservatives "want to
salve Russia's injured pride (...) [and] (...) polish Yeltsin's image as a steward of Russian
power."
193
They also view the union as being a "symbolic response to the planned eastern
189 Quoted in: Sergei Grivenkov, Russia Belarus Union Will Tell Negatively on Relations Within





192 The full draft of Yabloko's proposition is available on the Internet in Russian at the site http://
www.cis.lead.org/zarov/russian/bel-rus-union-yabloko.html; 22 April 1997
193 Quoted in: Lee Hockstader, Op. cit.
. p A23
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expansion of NATO, which Russia's political elite sees as a humiliation." 194 These dia-
metrically opposite views reveal some of the tensions that take place in the Kremlin's in-
ner power circle. The reformers appear to have won the April round by diluting the new-
est treaty's provisions. It is however likely that the fight will go on. Nobody can predict
who will win the next round.
In summary, there is no single stance of the Russians but, rather, a wide variety of
diverging opinions on the issue. Much of Russia's further policy will thus depend on (1)
the capacity of the Russian elites to find a consensus on the Federation's foreign policy




VI. TOWARD A REGIONAL INTEGRATION PROCESS
The implosion of the Soviet Union has been a tremendous disintegrative process.
Since then, disintegrative trends within, and outside of, the Russian Federation have not
stopped. Chechnya, for example, follows a separatist course and most Newly Independent
States keep their distance from their former hegemon. On the other hand, and as a natural
movement of the pendulum, the search for a new regional order also implies integrative
processes, the earliest of which having been the December 1991 establishment of the
CIS. Since 1995, integration processes have predominated in Russia's relations with Ar-
menia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. 195 So, the Belarusian longing for going
'back to Russia' and the project of a Union between the two countries take their place
within the framework of these integration tendencies.
To be sure, Russia has been weakened and humiliated by the amputation of much
of its former Empire. Evidently, it is momentarily merely a second-rate power. And
surely, it is still in search of a new domestic identity and a new regional and international
role. However, due to its size, its resources, and to the fact that it is a nuclear power, Rus-
sia imposes itself as the natural major regional player. Thus, any rapprochement and inte-
gration process in the region will depend on Russia or will need Russia's benevolent
agreement.
The idea of restoring any kind of Soviet Union is Utopian. Likewise, it is not to be
expected that Russia will ever be invited to join the European Union (EU) or NATO.
Russia is a Eurasian power. Thus, an admission of Russia into one of these organizations
195
Scott Parrish, Op. cit
. p. 33
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would decisively shift their geographical center of gravity toward Asia and - in doing so
- call for a radical change of their identity, aims, and policies. The EU and NATO simply
cannot accommodate Russia.
With Russia not being member of the EU or NATO, it would be unwise if these
organizations would enlarge up to this country's borders and close to Russia's core. 196 As
a major power that will sooner or later recover from its present weakness, Russia needs
buffering states between it and the Western organizations to which it will not belong.
Russia has a legitimate right to have a certain sphere of influence beyond its state bor-
ders.
Furthermore and despite any moral and political considerations, Europe will not
afford in the next decades to integrate the economies of all the countries that knock at its
door. Most Eastern European economies are not competitive on the world market and
will not become so in the foreseeable future. For them, the so-called "soft" or "light" big
Russian market is an attractive - or the only - alternative. 198
Finally and without straining Samuel Huntington's over-quoted "The Clash of
Civilizations?",
199
one also has to admit that Western values, beliefs, and cultural patterns
196 The Estonian-Russian border is only some 175 miles away from Saint Petersburg, while the
distance from the Belarusian-Russian frontier to Moscow amounts to less than 250 miles
197 So for example, the World Bank estimates that a successful economic integration of the sole
Poland into the western system will cost some 350 billion U.S. dollars and require this country to
use 20 to 30 percent of its gross national product (GNP) for investments. In: Peter Robejsek, Op-
en., p. 42
198
Slovakia's Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar admitted it recently quite frankly in saying: "Slo-
vakia is interested in the Russian market because Slovak goods match this market's needs."
Quoted in: Ibid.
199 Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, # 3, Summer
1993, pp. 22-49
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would be undermined if the West would try to integrate in its system all countries that are
keen on doing so.
Without any cynicism, one has to admit that there is simply not a Western "win-
dow of opportunities" for all states that have emerged from the former Soviet Empire.
Hence, it can be expected that the countries that do not aim at becoming part of the West
or will not be invited by the West to join its most important organizations will sooner or
later enter other regional integration processes. Among those, some will have no other
choice than to reenter the Russian orbit.
What shall be the design of a Russian led regional rapprochement or integration?
First, the example of the Belarusian-Russian Union shows that it would be in the interest
of Russia and of its likely partners to refrain from aiming at political superstructures be-
fore concrete integration objectives are defined and prioritized.
Second, Russia should, for the time being, strive for an economic, not for a politi-
cal integration process. In other words, it should capitalize ( 1 ) on its dominant position as
energy and raw material supplier for economies that still highly rely on agriculture and
industry, (2) on its large and undemanding market, and (3) on the regional strength of its
currency.
Third, the integration process should be initiated on a bilateral basis, as it is un-
likely that all CIS countries will either enter the process at the same time or enter it at all.
Fourth and in a later step, the establishment of closer political bonds could go
hand in hand with the formulation of an agreed foreign and security policy. Close politi-
cal bonds should however not imply that the mightier partner incorporates the weaker
one. We have seen in Chapter V above that some Russians view confederal structures as
95
being a likely organizational form for the Belarusian-Russian Union. Yet, confederations
- in which the center is not sovereign - have not survived into the 20 century. Such
structures are unsuited to today's world. Among other problems, a confederation cannot
join international organizations or sign international treaties because it is not considered a
subject of international law. The ambiguity of the Treaty on the Union of Belarus and
Russia on this issue has been stressed in Chapter IV above. On the other hand, in view of
Russia's regional preponderance, an integration process politically organized as a federa-
tion would amount to the incorporation of the junior partners we have warned against.
Hence, as pointed out before, Russia is well advised not to build rash political super-
structures that it does not really need and that would frighten its neighbors and the world.
Fifth, Russia should refrain, at least on its western flank, from establishing a sys-
tem of collective defense. In the absence of a common military threat, there is no need to
do so. 200 Likely integration partners would merely consider such a move as a threat di-
rected at them. Rather, the political integration should comprise a system of collective
security that would also address non-military threats.
Finally, Russia should not impose a quick process but rather establish a timeframe
for integration leading into the first decade of the next century, while initiating the pre-
paratory steps now. This would allow Russia to consolidate domestically, to reach a con-
sensus on a new foreign policy strategy, and to create the necessary integration structures.
Furthermore, this timeframe would allow countries that will not belong to a first wave of
200
This does not mean that concrete cooperation in specific spheres (early warning systems, air
and missile defense, outer border control in a custom union area, etc.) should not take place
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Western integration to assess their position between the European poles of attraction in a
more realistic way.
The sketched process might seem tamely non-Russian and thus unrealistic. It is
needless to say that such a design would not preclude Russia from using the leverage of
its natural regional and relative economic dominance to soften integration partners it
would like to have in its area of influence. The advantage of the proposed procedure is
that it would rest on a clearly formulated strategy, be constructive thanks to its coherence
and relative transparency, and thus help to stabilize the region and the continent. Hence,
such an integration could also represent the kind of serious Russian policy the West




The question raised in the thesis's title - Belarus - On The Road to Nationhood or
Back to a Merger with Russia? - remains to be clearly answered. The response is a no
and a perhaps.
First, Belarus is definitely not on the road to nationhood. The country's "national
nihilism"
201
is the thread running through the thesis. First of all, the lack of Belarusian
national identity expresses itself in highly symbolic attitudinal postures. Belarusians are
"ashamed"202 to speak their vernacular language. At the ballot box, they decided to move
the National Holiday from the commemoration of the declaration of independence in
1991 to the anniversary of Minsk's liberation from Nazi-Germany by the Red Army in
1944. And they agreed to return to a national flag and emblem that look similar to the
pre- 1991 ones. More substantially, but still as voters, Belarusians rebuff the nationalists
on the occasion of elections, while sanctioning the country's official course of close ties
with Russia. Despite an urban opposition that rallies under the lead of the nationalists,
there is a concurring view on the question between the people and its leaders. Thus,
President Lukashenko's regime is not the cause of Belarus's urge for a 'back to Russia'
but, rather, a consequence of this concurring view. So far, Belarus possesses all the at-
tributes of sovereignty. However it does not really act on them. Rather, it behaves in the
posture of a vassal toward Russia. The Belarusian collective historical memory is simply
201
See footnote 47
202 See footnote 37
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to have always been a part of a powerful and great superstructure: the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian, and the Soviet Empire.
Second, Belarus is perhaps on the road to a merger with Russia. The issue will be
decided in Moscow. While the Belarusian posture is clear-cut, the stance of Russia is less
discernible. Kremlin conservatives and reformists disagree on the question. This explains
the inconsistent official Russian policy and much of the contradictory statements of
President Yeltsin on the Belarusian issue. Seemingly, the factions of the group in power
have not yet found a consensus on determining Russia's real interests in Belarus. Slavic
brotherhood, so-called historical necessity, or an act of defiance toward NATO enlarge-
ment cannot be rational elements of a serious foreign policy. Rather, Russia has to deter-
mine how it best reintegrates Belarus in its sphere of influence without incriminating its
other regional and global foreign relations. In this regard, a unification of the two coun-
tries would bear nothing but disadvantages for Russia. Internationally, a westward ag-
grandizement of the Russian Federation would be interpreted as the attempt to start rees-
tablishing a kind of Soviet Union and would put a decisive strain on Russia's interna-
tional credibility and respectability. Bilaterally, Russia would saddle itself with the heavy
load of the muddled Belarusian political and economic situation. Domestically, it would
earn the applause of the nationalists and Communists but face the disapproval of the re-
formers and liberals and further weaken the cohesion within the government. Russia is
realist enough to know that. This is why the Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia of
2 April 1997 contains the sibylline formulation that the Union's "development shall be
directed at a consistent advance towards the voluntary unification of the two states." In
203 See footnote 157
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other words, the idea of a unification has not been abandoned but postponed sine die.
This does not bind Russia in any way, while it still allows its leader to beat now and then
the drum of a Slavic or "historically unavoidable" reunification when he sees it to be op-
portune for demagogic reasons.
Which legal form of political integration, then, shall a merger of the two countries
aim at? Chapter VI has touched on the advantages and disadvantages of confederal or
federal organization forms. It is worthless to restart the discussion here. The question is
simply not of acute importance yet. The two countries have first to agree on concrete in-
tegration aims, priorities and on implementation ways and schedules. An economic inte-
gration certainly has to take place before a political one. Thus, the political "wedding
clothes" of the two countries "are not yet ready."
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It is quite conceivable that the best
fitting "wedding clothes" will be an integration in which Belarus keeps its formal sover-
eignty while gravitating into Russia's orbit within narrow bounds. Whether sovereign or
not, Belarus has anyway not tried to free itself from Russia's influence. There is good





APPENDIX A. TREATY ON THE FORMATION OF THE COMMUNITY
OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA OF 2 APRIL 1996 205
The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the
Parties;
based on the historically shaped commonality of their people's destinies;
relying on their will for further rapprochement, as expressed in the results of the
May 1995 referendum in the Republic of Belarus and the October 1995 decisions of the
Russian Federation Federal Assembly chambers;
based on the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and
Cooperation between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation' of 21 February
1995;
reaffirming their participation in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the
'Treaty Between the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Re-
public, and the Russian Federation on the Deepening of Integration in the Economic and
Humanitarian Spheres' of 29 March 1 996;
have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The Parties have decided on a voluntary basis to form a profoundly politically and
economically integrated 'Community of Belarus and Russia' with a view to pooling the
material and intellectual potential of their states to boost the economy and create equal
conditions improving the living standards of the peoples and ensuring the spiritual devel-
opment of the individual.
Article 2
The Community is based on the principles of the sovereignty and equality of the
Parties, democracy and respect for Human Rights, and the generally accepted principles
and norms of international law.
205 The text is an unofficial English translation from the Russian original made available to the
author by the Embassy of the Republic of Belarus to the United States, 14 February 1997. The
layout is by the author.
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Article 3
The Parties shall agree their foreign policy, common positions on the main inter-
national issues, cooperate in safeguarding security, protecting borders and fighting crime.
With a view to ensuring reliable security, the Parties shall elaborate the common princi-
ples of military organizational development and the utilization of elements of the military
infrastructure in accordance with national legislation.
Article 4
In order to create a single economic area and ensure the effective functioning of
the common market and the free movement of goods, services, and capital and labor, the
Parties will by the end of 1997 synchronize the stages, timetable and depth of the eco-
nomic reforms implemented, create a single normative-legal basis for removing any in-
terstate barriers or restrictions and creating equal opportunities for free economic activity.
During this period, the Parties will set up a unified system of antimonopoly legis-
lation, taxes, state support for production, investment regime and labor protection norms
and regulations, and will also complete the creation of a single customs area with a uni-
fied administrative service.
Article 5
Before the end of 1996, the Parties will ensure the implementation of measures to
form a common transportation system with unified tariffs for the carriage of cargo and
passengers, as well as unified energy system, a common scientific, technological and in-
formation area.
Article 6
As of 1997, the Parties will coordinate their structural policy for the further de-
velopment of their economies, with a view to creating industrial and agrarian economic
complexes based on the mutual complementarity of the economies and the maximum
utilization of the advantages of a rational division of labor, specialization and production
sharing.
As of 1997, the transition will be made to compiling joint balance sheets of pro-
duction capacities and coordinating their utilization in the Parties' interests.
Article 7
Before the end of 1 997, the unification of monetary, credit and budgetary systems




• shall ensure the equal rights of the Parties' citizens to receive an education,
find work, receive pay or be granted other social guarantees;
• shall introduce single standards of social protection;
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• shall ensure equal rights for individuals to acquire property and to own,
utilize and dispose of it on their territories;
• shall equalize the conditions of pension provision and levels of benefits and
concessions to war and labor veterans, the disabled and low-income families;
• shall unify norms in the sphere of labor protection, social insurance and pro-
duction and social sanitation;
• shall create a common information base on the questions of the employment
of the population and the existence ofjob vacancies.
Article 9
The supreme body of the Community is the Supreme Council, which shall include
the heads of state and government, the leaders of the Parties' parliaments and as well as
the Chairman of the Executive Committee.
Within the limits of the Community's powers, the Supreme Council examines and
resolves the most important issues of Community development, monitors and directs the
activities of its bodies in carrying out decisions reached.
The Supreme Council determines the location of Community bodies.
The Supreme Council elects the chairman on a rotating basis for a two-year term.
Supreme Council decisions are made on the basis of unanimity, whereby each
Party has one vote. The Chairman of the Executive Committee has a deliberative vote.
The Supreme Council approves its statute.
Article 10
The parties shall set up a Parliamentary Assembly formed from an equal number
of parliamentarians from each of the Parties.
The Parliamentary Assembly shall adopt model acts of legislation and make correspond-
ing proposals to bodies with the right of legislative initiative, to the Parties' parliaments,
and to the Supreme Council on the questions of developing the Community's legal base.
Parliamentary Assembly decisions shall be made by a qualified majority vote.
Parliamentary Assembly sessions shall have a quorum if attended by at least two-
thirds of the deputies from each Party.
The Parliamentary Assembly adopts its standing orders.
Article 1
1
In order to organize practical work to implement the Treaty, the Supreme Council
shall set up an Executive Committee as a standing executive body, as well as sectorial
administrative bodies.
The Supreme Council appoints the Chairman of the Executive Committee.
The Executive Committee includes an equal number of representatives of the
Parties. The corresponding head of state approves the individual composition of repre-
sentatives of the Parties on the Executive Committee.
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The Executive Committee:
• draws up plans and programs to implement Community purposes and tasks;
proposals on the funding of measures implemented by the Community; and
proposals on the creation of bodies and organizations ensuring the resolution
of corresponding Community tasks - and submits them for approval by the
Supreme Council;
• draws up and approves measures to carry out Supreme Council decisions
and approved Community projects and programs, organizes and monitors their
implementation;
• coordinates the activity of other bodies and organizations used by either
Party to implement Community projects and programs;
• concludes on its own behalf corresponding civil law contracts;
• within the limits of the funds allocated to the Community budget provides
financial and other support for projects, programs and individual measures
that are being implemented;
• annually provides the Supreme Council with reports on the implementation
of Community projects and programs.
The statute of this committee, approved by the Supreme Council determines the
functions of the Executive Committee and the procedure for its activity.
The Executive Committee has a staff whose size is determined by the Supreme
Council.
Article 12
The functions of the bodies set up by the Community include:
• the implementation of a common economic and social policy, the develop-
ment and implementation ofjoint programs;
the formation of a single normative-legal base;
the implementation of measures aimed at unifying monetary, credit, tax, and
budgetary systems;
the development and implementation of measures which create the condi-
tions for the introduction of a common currency;
the shaping of unified power generation, transportation and communication
systems;
the rational sitting of new production capacity and modernization of existing
capacity;
cooperation in solving the population's employment problems;
the coordinated implementation of foreign economic ties;
the joint organization of customs arrangements;
the shaping of common standards, models, systems of measurement and
statistics;
the comprehensive promotion of the development of a common scientific,
educational, and cultural area;
cooperation in ensuring the protection of the environment and liquidation of
the consequences of accidents and natural disasters;
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• the creation of a unified meteorological service;
• cooperation in safeguarding security and protecting borders.
Article 13
The Supreme Council and the Executive Committee are entitled within their com-
petence to make decisions to be directly implemented, without detriment to the Parties'
Constitutions, or decisions to be transformed into national legislation.
Article 14
The Community budget is formed from annual payments from the Parties' state
budgets and is used to fund common programs and maintain Community bodies.
On the basis of additional agreements, the Parties shall transfer to Community
bodies the property needed to implement the powers entrusted to them. This property is
jointly owned by the Parties and is used exclusively in their common interests.
Article 15
While participating in the Community, each of the Parties retains its state sover-
eignty, independence and territorial integrity, its Constitution, state flag, coat of arms,
national anthem, and other attributes of state power.
Article 16
The states forming the Community are subjects of international law and inde-
pendently establish diplomatic and consular relations, trade and other relations with for-
eign states, and conclude international treaties.
The Parties retain their membership to the United Nations and other international
organizations.
Article 17
The further development of the Community and its structure shall be determined




This treaty is open for accession to by other states that share its purposes and
iples and fully accept the obligations stemming from the treaty.
Article 19
This treaty is applied provisionally from the date of its signature, is subject to rati-
fication and comes into force on the day of the exchange of the instruments of ratifica-
tion.
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Done at Moscow on 2 April 1996, in two copies, each in Belarusian and Russian,
both texts being equally authoritative.
For the Republic of Belarus For the Russian Federation
Aleksandr Lukashenka Boris Yeltsin
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APPENDIX B. TREATY ON THE UNION OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA
OF 2 APRIL 1997 206
The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation;
proceeding from their spiritual closeness and the common historical destiny of
their peoples;
guided by their will for further unification;
striving effectively to use the material and intellectual potentials of Belarus and
Russia in the interests of their social and economic progress;
acting in keeping with the foundations of the constitutional systems of the two
contracting Parties and with the generally recognized principles and norms of interna-
tional law;
proceeding from the 'Treaty on the Community of Belarus and Russia' of 2 April
1 996, and further developing its provisions for the purposes of achieving genuine inte-
gration in the economic and other spheres of public life;
have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The Community of Belarus and Russia shall be transformed into a Union and
shall be vested with all the powers envisaged by the 'Union Charter'.
Each Party to the Union shall retain its state sovereignty, independence, and ter-
ritorial integrity, Constitution, national flag, emblem, and other attributes of statehood.
Article 2
The goals of the Union are
• to strengthen the relations of fraternity, friendship and all round coopera-
tion between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation in the politi-
cal, economic, social, military, scientific, cultural, and other areas;
• to enhance the living standards of the peoples and to create favorable con-
ditions for the all round harmonious development of the individual;
206 The text is an unofficial English translation from the Russian original made available to the
author by the Embassy of the Republic of Belarus to the United States, 18 April 1997. The layout
is by the author.
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• to promote the stable socio-economic development of the Parties to the
Union by pooling their material and intellectual potentials and drawing on the
market mechanisms for the functioning of their economies;
• to approximate the national legal systems and shape a legal system for the
Union;
• to ensure security and maintain a high level of defense capability, jointly
to combat crime;
• to help ensure all-European security and develop mutually advantageous
cooperation in Europe and in the World as a whole.
Article 3
The 'Union Charter' is an inseparable part of this treaty.
Article 4
The present treaty and the 'Union Charter' may be amended and supplemented on
mutual consent of the contracting Parties. All such amendments and supplements are
subject to ratification.
Article 5
The present treaty does not affect the rights and commitments of the contracting
Parties, stipulated by other international agreements, in which they participate, and is not
directed against any third countries.
Article 6
The Treaty on the Community of Belarus and Russia' of 2 April 1996 and the
normative legal acts adopted earlier by the bodies of the Community remain in force if
they do not contradict the present treaty.
Article 7
The present treaty is open for accession to other states that are subjects of interna-
tional law and share its goals and the principles of the Union, and assume in full the
commitments stemming from the treaty and the 'Union Charter'. Such accession can be
effected with the consent of the Parties to the treaty.
Article 8
The present treaty and the 'Union Charter', signed by the heads of state of the
contracting Parties, are to be ratified and shall take effect from the day when the ratifica-
tion instruments are exchanged. The present treaty has no time limit. Either of the two




The present treaty shall be registered in keeping with Article 102 of the Charter of
the United Nations Organization.
Done at Moscow on 2 April 1997, in two copies, each in Belarusian and Russian,
both texts being equally authoritative.
For the Republic of Belarus For the Russian Federation
Aleksandr Lukashenka Boris Yeltsin
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APPENDIX C. CHARTER OF THE UNION OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA
OF 2 APRIL 1997 207
The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the
Parties;
guided by the will of the peoples to bring together the two states, have formed the
Union of Belarus and Russia.
CHAPTER 1 : UNION, PRINCIPLES AND AIMS
Article 1
The Parties, forming the Union of Belarus and Russia, hereinafter referred to as
the Union, shall act on the basis of this Charter, which is an inalienable part of the Treaty
on the Union of Belarus and Russia' of 2 April 1997.
Article 2
Citizenship of the Union shall be instituted. Each citizen of the Republic of Be-
larus and each citizen of the Russian Federation shall be simultaneously a citizen of the
Union.
Article 3
The Union shall be based on the principles of the sovereign equality of the Par-
ties, democracy and respect for Human Rights, cooperation and mutual assistance, vol-
untary involvement, conscientious fulfillment of mutual obligations and other generally
recognized principles and norms of international law.
The prospects of the Union's development shall be directed at a consistent ad-
vance towards the voluntary unification of the two states on the basis of the free expres-
sion of the will of their peoples, the observance of the constitutions of the participating
states and proceeding from the sovereign equality of its members and generally recog-
nized norms and principles of international law.
Article 4
Within the framework of powers granted by this Charter, the Union shall be a
subject of international law.
207 The text is an unofficial English translation from the Russian original made available to the
author by the Embassy of the Republic of Belarus to the United States, 18 April 1997. The layout
is by the author.
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Article 5
The 'Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia' of 2 April 1997, the present
Charter, the 'Treaty on the Formation of the Community of Belarus and Russia' of 2 April
1 996, other bilateral treaties between the Parties, as well as normative legal acts of the
bodies of the Union, adopted within the sphere of their competence, shall serve as the le-
gal framework for the activity of the Union.
The previously adopted normative legal acts of the bodies of the Community of
Belarus and Russia shall remain valid in the part that does not contradict this Charter.
Article 6
The aims of the Union shall be:
• to strengthen relations of brotherhood, friendship and all round cooperation
between the Parties in the political, economic, social, military, scientific, cul-
tural, and other areas;
• to raise the living standards of the peoples and to create favorable conditions
for the all round harmonious development of the Parties on the basis of
merging their material and intellectual potentials and utilizing market mecha-
nisms of the functioning of the economy;
• to draw closer the national legal systems and to form a legal system of the
Union;
• to ensure security and to maintain a degree of defense capability and jointly to
fight crime;
• to facilitate the maintenance of all-European security and the development of
mutually advantageous cooperation in Europe and the World.
Article 7
A state that is a subject of international law, that shares the aims and principles of
the Union and assumes the obligations provided for by the 'Treaty on the Union of Be-
larus and Russia' and this Charter may be a participant in the Union.
Accession to the Union shall be with the consent of the Parties.
A state that accedes to the Union shall abide by the decisions that were already
adopted by the Union's bodies without any reservations whatsoever.
CHAPTER II: TASKS OF THE UNION
Article 8
In the political sphere the tasks of the Union shall be:
• to coordinate positions and actions when solving general political problems by
way of consultations and exchange of information;
• to work out common positions on international matters of mutual interests;
• to take agreed-upon measures to ensure international peace and security, in-
cluding by way of achieving international accords on the limitation and re-
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duction of armaments and military spending, by way of liquidating nuclear
and other types of weapons of mass destruction;
• to promote the development of democracy, universal respect for, and imple-
mentation of, Human Rights and basic freedoms in accordance with generally
recognized principles and norms of international law.
Article 9
In the economic sphere the tasks of the Union shall be:
• to ensure the stable economic development of the Parties in conditions of a
socially oriented market;
• to create a single economic area, equal conditions and guarantees of the activ-
ity of the economic entities of the Parties;
• to form and implement an agreed-upon program of market reforms with due
account for the specificities of the economic development of each Party and
the principle of social justice;
• to create and develop a single infrastructure and first of all integrated trans-
port, energy and communications systems, a single scientific-technological
and information space;
• to ensure the functioning of unified monetary, credit and budget systems and a
tax system, to create the necessary conditions for the introduction of a single
currency;
• to apply in relations with third countries a similar trade regime, common cus-
toms tariffs, measures of non-tariff regulation of foreign trade, to develop
mutual trade and to ensure the effective functioning of the single customs
space;
• to ensure an agree-upon development, location and utilization of production
capacities;
• to ensure on the territory of each of the Parties for the citizens and legal enti-
ties of the other Parties the national regime in the field of acquisition, posses-
sion, use and disposal of property.
Article 10
In the social sphere the tasks of the Union shall be:
• to move over to uniform standards of social protection, gradually to even out
the living standards of the population of the Parties, labor remuneration, pen-
sions, sizes of allowances, and benefits of veterans of war, the armed forces,
invalids and families in the low-income bracket;
• to ensure equal rights of the citizens of Parties in education, medical assis-
tance, employment, labor remuneration, and the granting of other social guar-
antees;
• to introduce single standards in the field of labor protection, social insurance,
industrial and social hygiene;
• to create a joint data base on population employment and job vacancies;
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• to facilitate the development of education and the mutual enrichment of cul-
tures, the exercise of equal rights and freedom of expression, the preservation
and development of the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic identity of the peoples.
Article 1
1
In the sphere of ensuring security the tasks of the Union shall be:
• to adopt in case of necessity adequate joint measures to avert a threat to the
sovereignty and independence of each of the Parties;
• to coordinate the activity of the Parties in the field of military development
and the development of their armed forces, to jointly utilize the military infra-
structure and to adopt other adequate measures with due account for the inter-
ests of the Parties in order to maintain the defense capability of the Parties and
the Union as a whole;
• to work out and place [?; probably: implement] a joint defense order, to ensure
the delivery and sale on its basis of armaments and military equipment, to cre-
ate a joint system of the technical supply of the armed forces of the Parties;
• to ensure interaction in protecting the borders of the Union;
• to fight against corruption, terrorism, and other crimes.
Article 12
In the legal sphere the tasks of the Union shall be:
• to develop the normative legal framework for the purpose of ensuring the
further integration of the Parties;
• to unify and coordinate the development of the legislation of the Parties;
• to cooperate in the field of the codification and systematization of legal acts;
• to provide mutual normative legal assistance, to cooperate in the creation and
development of a database in various areas of law.
Article 13
The provisions of Articles 8 to 12 of this Charter shall be implemented in the
context of the provisions concerning powers and terms of reference, as the Charter pro-
vides it for.
CHAPTER III: POWERS AND TERMS OF REFERENCE
Article 14
The terms of reference of the Union shall include:
a) exercise and protection of the rights of the citizens of the Parties that they
have as citizens of the Union;
b) insurance of the equality of the rights of the citizens of the Union in getting all
kinds of education and medical assistance, in employment, labor remuneration, and other
areas;
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c) development of the legal system of the Union, including the adoption of nor-
mative legal acts;
d) regulation of the activity of the single power, transport and communication
systems;
e) development of mutual trade, free flow of commodities, services, capital and
labor within the customs territory of the Union;
pursuance of a single customs policy, including insurance of uniformity of
managing customs activities within the single customs territory;
g) creation of favorable conditions for the functioning of the single scientific,
technological, and information area, pursuance of a coordinated structural policy, fulfill-
ment of joint scientific and production programs, the establishment and functioning of
joint transnational companies;
h) management of the property of the Union;
i) unification of currency regulation with the aim of gradual transition to a single
currency;
j) introduction of single standards, metric systems, and single statistics;
k) approval of the budget of the Union;
1) elaboration and creation of a mechanism to control the implementation of
adopted decisions, including fulfillment of the budget;
m) assistance to the coordinated development of the legislation of the Parties;
n) approval of the symbols of the Union.
The Parties may grant the Union other powers and reference in accordance with
the procedure stipulated in Article 36 of this Charter.
Article 15
The joint terms of reference of the Union and the Parties shall be:
a) coordination of the fundamentals of the Union's policy, implementation of
Union programs in the economic, social, ecological, and cultural fields;
b) coordination of foreign policy in the sphere of mutual interests;
c) coordination of foreign economic policy, including in respect of commodities
and services crossing the customs border of the Union, as well as licensing, price regula-
tion and other measures on non-tariff regulation, rates and mechanisms of levying cus-
toms and other duties, as well as taxes connected with foreign economic activity;
d) insurance of the collective security of the Parties;
e) interaction in ensuring the territorial inviolability of the Parties and guarding
the border of the Union;
f) the fight against corruption, terrorism, and other criminal activity;
g) drafting and implementation of agreed-upon measures to ensure population
employment;
h) formation of the legal framework of the Union, of agreed-upon legal funda-
mentals for economic, social, and cultural development;
i) creation and development of unified monetary, credit, budget, and currency
systems, financial markets, coordination of the fundamentals of antimonopoly, tax and
investment legislation;
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j) working out of agreed-upon standards of social protection, the pension sys-
tem, levels of social guarantees in the field of labor, employment, labor protection, social
insurance, pensions, social protection, industrial and social hygiene;
k) pursuance of an agreed-upon policy in the field of environmental protection,
hydrometeorology, ecological safety, liquidation of the consequences of natural calami-
ties and disasters, first of all the disaster at the Chernobyl power plant.
Article 16
This Charter shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties that were
adopted within the framework of the CIS and also under international treaties.
CHAPTER IV: CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNION
Article 17
The Union citizenship of a citizen of the Republic of Belarus and a citizen of the
Russian Federation shall not diminish his/her rights and freedoms and shall not free
him/her of the duties that stem from the citizenship of the corresponding Party.
Along with the rights and duties stemming from the citizenship of the corre-
sponding state, the citizens of the Union shall be granted rights and shall fulfil duties
connected with Union citizenship.
A citizen of the Union shall have the right:
a) to free travel and permanent residence within the territory of the Republic of
Belarus and the territory of the Russian Federation with observance of the regulations
established by the laws of the Parties in respect of separate areas and localities;
b) to take part in managing the affairs of the Union both directly and through
his/her representatives;
c) to protection on the territory of a third country, in case there is no representa-
tion of the state whose citizen he/she is, by the diplomatic representations or consular in-
stitutions of the other state on the same terms as the citizens of this state;
d) to possess, use, and dispose of property on the territory of the other Party on
the same terms as the citizens of this state.
A citizen of the Union permanently living in the other participating state shall
have the right to elect and be elected to local self-government bodies on the territory of
this state.
If they so desire, citizens of the Parties may be issued a separate document certi-
fying their Union citizenship.
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CHAPTER V: BODIES OF THE UNION
Article 18
1. To implement the tasks of the Union, the Parties shall form on a parity basis a
Supreme Council, a Parliamentary Assembly, an Executive Committee and, should this
be necessary, other bodies of the Union.
2. The bodies of the Union shall adopt decision within the sphere of their com-
petence and without detriment to the constitutional principles of the Parties.
3. Should this be necessary, the bodies of state power of the Parties shall bring
their acts in line with the decisions of the Union bodies or promulgate acts ensuring im-
plementation of these decisions.
CHAPTER VI: SUPREME COUNCIL
Article 19
The Supreme Council, consisting of the heads of state, heads of government,
heads of the chambers of the parliaments of the Parties, as well as the chairman of the
Executive Committee, shall be the supreme body of the Union.
The Supreme Council shall solve all questions referred by this Charter to the
terms of reference of the Union, as well as questions concerning the powers of the Union
in the area of the joint terms of reference of the Union and the Parties.
The Supreme Council shall:
• decide on key questions of the Union's development;
• study questions concerning the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citi-
zens of the Union;
• establish bodies of the Union, determine their location and the terms of their
stay, and direct their activity;
• approve the budget of the Union;
• ensure the interaction of the bodies of the Union among themselves and with
the bodies of state power ofthe Parties;
• adopt decisions on questions of ensuring the security of the Parties on ques-
tions of their collective defense against outside encroachments, protection of
the borders of the Union, military development, and the fight against crime;
• not less than once a year hear a report by the Executive Committee on the im-
plementation of the decisions adopted by the Union's bodies.
Decisions of the Supreme Council shall be adopted on the basis of unanimity,
whereby each Party has one vote.
The work of the Supreme Council shall be conducted on the basis of the "Statute
and the Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Council" approved by it.
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Article 20
The chairman of the Supreme Council shall be elected by the Supreme Council
from among the presidents of the Parties on the basis of rotation for a term of two years,
unless another decision is adopted.
The chairman of the Supreme Council shall:
• organize and supervise the work of the Council;
• preside at its meetings;
• represent the Union in relations with states and international organizations;
• conduct international negotiations on behalf of the Union, conclude interna-
tional treaties on behalf of the Union with the consent of the Supreme Council
and within the powers granted by the Supreme Council;
• sign decisions adopted by the Supreme Council.
CHAPTER VII: PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY
Article 2
1
The Parliamentary Assembly shall be the representative body of the Union.
The Parliamentary Assembly shall consist of deputations delegated respectively
by the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus and the Federal Assembly of the
Russian Federation. Each parliamentary deputation shall include an equal number of rep-
resentatives.
Representatives shall be delegated to the Parliamentary Assembly and recalled by
the parliaments of the Parties in accordance with their procedures. The term and proce-
dure for the termination of the powers of a parliamentary delegation shall be determined
independently by the corresponding parliament.
Article 22
The Parliamentary Assembly shall:
• resolve the issues of developing the regulatory and legal basis for the integra-
tion of the Parties in the political, legal, economic, social, humanitarian, and
other fields;
• adopt legislative acts with the status of legislative recommendation of the
Union subject to priority consideration and adoption under established proce-
dure by the parliaments of the Parties for the purpose of harmonizing their
legislation;
• submit proposals on the development of the legal framework of the Union to
the bodies of the Parties which have the right to initiate Legislation, and to the
Supreme Council;
• contribute to harmonizing the legislation of the Parties;
• ensure the interaction of the parliaments of the Parties on the issues of mutual
interest;
• participate in the formation of the bodies of the Union;
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•consider the draft budget of the Union;
exercise supervisory functions within the limits established under this Charter;
• hear the addresses of the Supreme Council on the guidelines for the develop-
ment of the Union;
• approve international treaties concluded on behalf of the Union;
• contribute to the exchange of legal information, participate in the creation of a
single information and legal system of the Union;
• conclude cooperation agreements with the parliaments of foreign states and
international parliamentary organizations;
• exercise any other powers in accordance with this Charter.
Article 23
The Parliamentary Assembly shall hold sessions. The sessions of the Assembly
shall be deemed validly convened if attended by no less than two-thirds of each deputa-
tion.
The Parliamentary Assembly shall operate on the basis of its regulations.
The Parliamentary Assembly shall form standing and ad hoc commissions from
amongst its members that interact within their frames of reference with the corresponding
committees and commissions of the chambers of the parliaments of the Parties.
The chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly shall be elected on a rotation basis
by the Parliamentary Assembly from amongst the speakers of the chambers of the par-
liaments of the Parties for a term oftwo years.
The chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly and his first deputy may not be a
citizen of one and the same Party.
The chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly, his deputies and the heads of
standing commissions shall form the Council of the Parliamentary Assembly.
The activities of the Parliamentary Assembly shall be supported by a permanent
Secretariat of the Parliamentary Assembly headed by the executive secretary approved by
a session of the Parliamentary Assembly.
Article 24
The right to submit draft legislation to the Parliamentary Assembly shall be vested
in: the bodies of the Union, the heads of state, parliaments, the governments of the Par-
ties, the deputations of Belarus and Russia, as well as groups of deputies constituting not
less than one-fifth of the total number of deputies of the Parliamentary Assembly.
The decisions of the Parliamentary Assembly shall be adopted if voted by not less
than half of the total number of each deputation.
Article 25
The Parties shall create conditions for transforming the Parliamentary Assembly
into a representative and legislative body of the Union elected directly by the citizens of
the Union.
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CHAPTER VIII: THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Article 26
The Executive Committee shall be the permanent executive body of the Union.
The Supreme Council shall form the Executive Committee.
The Executive Committee shall include equal numbers of representatives of the
Parties. The head of the corresponding state shall approve the personal composition of the
representatives of the Parties in the Executive Committee.
The Supreme Council shall appoint the chairman and deputy chairmen of the Ex-
ecutive Committee.
Article 27
The functions of the Executive Committee and the procedure of its activities shall
be determined by a statute approved by the Supreme Council as proposed by the Execu-
tive Committee.
The decisions of the Executive Committee shall be adopted by consensus,
whereby each Party has one vote.
The Executive Committee shall have the right, within its terms of reference, to
adopt self-implementing decisions binding for all the sectoral and other bodies of the
Union and for the bodies of executive power in conformity with the legislation of the
Parties.
The Executive Committee shall annually submit to the Supreme Council and the
Parliamentary Assembly reports on the progress in the implementation of the projects and
programs of the Union.
A decision of the Executive Committee may be suspended or cancelled by the
Supreme Council.
The Executive Committee shall have a staff the size of which shall be determined
by the Supreme Council.
The head of the staff shall be the business administrator of the Executive Com-
mittee appointed by the Supreme Council.
Article 28
To perform the functions stipulated under this Charter, the decisions of the Su-
preme Council may, on the basis of proposals made by the Executive Committee, estab-
lish sectoral and other bodies as well as organizations of the Union. Each such body shall
proceed on the basis of a corresponding statute approved by the Executive Committee.
Such bodies shall be created on the basis of parity and shall pursue their activities
on a collegiate basis.
Article 29
The executive bodies of the Parties, proceeding from the decisions of the bodies
referred to in Article 28, shall take measures to ensure the implementation of such deci-
sions within the established deadlines.
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The budget of the Union shall be formed for the purpose of financing the joint
programs, projects, and events as well as for the maintenance of the bodies of the Union.
The Executive Committee shall develop and submit the budget for approval
by the Supreme Council and shall monitor its implementation.
2. The revenues of the Union budget shall be formed from:
a) deductions envisaged by the state budgets of the Parties according to stan-
dards and in amounts approved by the parliaments of the Parties;
b) proceeds from the property of the Union;
c) incomes from investment of temporarily free resources at the disposal of the
bodies of the Union in deposit accounts with banks and from the transfer of assets in trust
management under contracts;
d) other revenues.
The Supreme Council in consultation with the Parliamentary Assembly shall
approve the areas of spending of the Union budget.
3. The maintenance of the bodies of the Union shall be financed out of the Union
budget unless otherwise determined by the Supreme Council. The Executive Committee
in accordance with the regulatory and legal acts of the Union shall regulate financial and
economic issues of the activities of the bodies of the Union.
The Parties shall independently incur the costs of the events not foreseen by the
Union budget.
Article 31
The Parties shall provide the necessary conditions to ensure the convertibility of
their currencies in current operations to create a uniform currency system of the Union
with subsequent introduction of a single currency.
The monetary systems of the Parties shall be united through the formation of a
single emission center.
Article 32
The Parties may transfer for temporary use to the bodies of the Union the property
required for the exercise of their powers. Such property shall be used exclusively for the
performance of the tasks of the Union under this Charter.





The officials of the bodies of the Union and the staff thereof shall be ap-
pointed from amongst the citizens of the Parties.
2. The officials of the staff of the bodies of the Union:
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a) may not combine their work with other activities for remuneration with the
exception of teaching, research, and other creative activities;
b) may not engage in activities incompatible with their status of officials of the
staff of the bodies of the Union and use their position, among other things, in the interests
of political parties and associations.
3. The officials of the bodies of the Union and the staff thereof in the course of
their employment shall enjoy the social welfare, medical and transport services under a
procedure and on terms stipulated by the legislation of the host state for corresponding
groups of civil servants.
4. Pensions shall be provided for the officials referred to in Chapter III in accor-
dance with the procedure and on the terms set forth by applicable legislation for the civil
servants of the states of which they are citizens.




In the event of differences over the application or interpretation of the 'Treaty
on the Union of Belarus and Russia' and this Charter, the Parties will, in the spirit of co-
operation, seek to settle them fairly through mutual consultations and negotiations.
The Parties shall seek to prevent possible differences through corresponding
bodies of the Union.
The Supreme Council of the Union shall be authorized to administer corre-
sponding conciliatory procedures to settle the differences.
2. In the event a Party shall adopt a normative legal act that violates this Charter
or the normative legal acts adopted pursuant to this aim, the Supreme Council and, within
its frame of reference, the Executive Committee, shall draw the attention of the state
bodies of such state to the violation for the purpose of curing such violation.
3. The Parties shall establish the Court of the Union.
CHATER XII: WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UNION
Article 35
A Party shall have the right to withdraw from the Union. It shall provide written
notification of its intention to withdraw from the Union to the Supreme Council and the
other Party 1 2 months in advance.
The withdrawal of one Party from the Union shall not affect the performance by
such participant of the obligations that arose during the period of participation in the Un-
ion and for whose implementation a definite period of time has been fixed.
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CHAPTER XIII: FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 36
The Parties, the Supreme Council, and the Parliamentary Assembly may propose
amendments to this Charter. The Supreme Council shall consider draft resolutions on
amendments.
Amendments shall be ratified by the Parties and shall come into force from the
time of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
Article 37
To resolve fundamental issues of further development of the Union, referenda
may be held under a procedure and in compliance with the laws of the Parties.
Article 38
The working language of the bodies of the Union shall be Russian.
Article 39
This Charter shall be subject to ratification together with the 'Treaty on the Union
of Belarus and Russia' and shall come into force from the time of the exchange of instru-
ments of ratification.
Done at Moscow on 2 April 1997, in two copies, each copy being in the Belaru-
sian and Russian languages.
For the Republic of Belarus For the Russian Federation
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